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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**BUILDING A BETTER MOUSE TRAP: INCREASING
LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTER TERRORISM
CAPABILITIES THROUGH CONSOLIDATION**

by

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March 2006

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COUNTER TERRORISM CAPABILITIES THROUGH CONSOLIDATION**

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ABSTRACT

The current American police model is outdated and does not provide local law enforcement the proper framework to effectively prevent, mitigate, and respond to terrorism. With nearly 18,000 separate police departments in the United States, the current system of policing is individualized, fragmented and disconnected. With the proliferation of so many police organizations, contiguous agencies have overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities and job functions, leading to the waste of precious personnel resources. Exacerbating this issue, radio systems and computerized databases among these law enforcement agencies are dissimilar or not linked, prohibiting local cops from easily communicating. Such technological gaps are the outcomes of a decentralized policing structure that hinder effective counter terrorism capabilities. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, local police must be configured in a manner to maximize the country's counterterrorism efforts.

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Charles Dickens

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I. INTRODUCTION

The al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, were not agents of a foreign government or a particular country. The nineteen hijackers who carried out the most deadly attack on American soil were devoted to an organization with a religious ideology that is dedicated to killing Americans and the ultimate destruction of the United States.¹ This terrorist group is supported and protected by a covert and broad based network of devoted followers, including some rogue states, who provide financial and tactical support in order for the group to be successful.²

The organizational make-up of al Qaeda presents many challenges and is relatively unique to the United States when comparing it to past enemies, military conflicts, or wars. These terrorists have no geographical boundaries or identifiable infrastructure to retaliate against. In fact, they reside in many of the world's free societies, including the United States. Their soldiers and other support personnel live in a clandestine manner, making them difficult to detect. The al Qaeda operatives working in this capacity present themselves as law-abiding persons, assimilating into neighborhoods, schools, and work places. Imbedding themselves into society, they patiently plan their next attack.³ They find innovative ways to communicate, organize, and formulate their missions without discovery. In a sense, the persons within this terrorist organization are faceless.

The complexity and open nature of American society combined with the country's immense geographical boundaries make it seemingly infeasible to protect against an enemy with the versatility and motivation the likes of al Qaeda. In fact, opponents of devising and implementing a strategic plan say it would be futile and not worth the effort.⁴ Critics, who maintain a homeland security plan is pointless, identify

¹ Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: from the Klan to al Qaeda* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 119-121.

² Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda* (Arlington: RAND, 2002), 13-22.

³ Ibid.

⁴ David Carr, *Futility of Homeland Defense*, January 2002, available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/2002/01/carr.htm>, accessed on November 1, 2005.

gaping holes in our current protective mechanisms and surmise a successful plan to be out of reach.⁵ They say that America is in the untenable position of having an infinite number of ripe targets with a finite number of resources to provide protection.⁶ While the difficulties of fighting terrorism are vast and challenging, it is counterintuitive not to focus on prevention and protection as a means to fight the war on terrorism.

The United States initially created an ad-hoc asymmetric strategy to influence and deter terrorists and displace their complex support system. This approach emphasized:

- A powerful military response.
- Greater intelligence gathering.
- Increased information sharing among law enforcement agencies.
- Economic sanctions against perpetrators (when possible).
- An unyielding political philosophy to eliminate terrorism.
- Collaboration with foreign countries.
- The utilization of non-traditional governmental agencies.⁷

This multi-dimensional way of fighting terrorism has been effective, diminishing al Qaeda's membership, resources, and system of support.⁸ Many of its operatives have been captured or killed during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and a large number of the group's associates have been detected or disrupted through an aggressive and persistent application of intelligence and law enforcement investigations around the world. However, this strategy is fashioned for the federal government and it does not address how local police may contribute to preventing and protecting from terrorist attacks.

In July of 2002, the federal government published its plan for protecting America in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. This document outlined the new policies, procedures, and responsibilities related to the prevention, protection, and response to terrorism for all levels of government. However, it only referenced local law enforcement

⁵ David Carr, *Futility of Homeland Defense*, January 2002, available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/2002/01/carr.htm>, accessed on November 1, 2005.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Davis and Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence*, 24.

⁸ Ibid.

as first responders, implying that these agencies did not have a role in the prevention or protection aspect of terrorism. The strategy diminished the importance and potential impact local law enforcement contributed to stopping a terrorist attack before it occurred. Perhaps this approach was purposeful, reflecting the federal government's belief that the nature of policing in the United States was far too splintered to be part of an effective prevention and protection mechanism against terrorism. Was the current structure of policing perceived to be inadequate for local cops to be successfully integrated into the nation's preventative apparatus for the war on terrorism? The development and history of the American police model is provided as support for this assumption.

A. THE AMERICAN POLICE MODEL

The industrial revolution and wealthy Americans interested in protecting their business interests were one of the main catalysts for the creation of modern police departments in the mid-nineteenth century within the United States.⁹ In many cities, street crime, mob violence and social unrest became commonplace. The existing law enforcement mechanism struggled to suppress this anti-social behavior, resulting in the formation of individual municipal police departments for the purposes of order maintenance within specified jurisdictions. These initial police departments grew in power and size, wielding great authority as they enforced stringent laws in a considerably tough socioeconomic time.¹⁰ Local politicians seized the opportunity to control these police departments in order to maintain power.¹¹ As new towns and cities were established, an increasing number of independent police departments were soon created to keep the peace and deter criminal activity. Each city devised its own police agency with different guidelines, operating procedures, and equipment. At the time, there were no standards established for police departments and no governing body to determine best practices for this evolving profession, causing many of the initial police departments to be breeding grounds for graft, brutality, and ineffective policing.¹² While many police reforms were theorized, actual change took over 50 years to occur. During this time, a

⁹ Joseph J. Senna, *Introduction to Criminal Justice* (New York: Wadsworth, 2002), 143.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

decentralized police model had already taken shape across the nation. Over several decades, studies of law enforcement practices in the United States were performed in hopes of improving the police profession and its structure. The findings of these investigative bodies identified the same problematic thread: American law enforcement was far too decentralized.

In 1933, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement was formed to study policing in the United States. The Wickersham Report, as it was known, identified considerable problems consistent in urban police forces:

The multitude of police forces in any state and the varying standards of organization and services have contributed immeasurably to the general low grade of police performance in this country. The independence which police forces display toward each other in the absence of any central force which requires either a uniform or minimum standard of service leaves the way open for the profitable operation of criminals in an area where protection is often ineffectual at the best, generally only partial, and too frequently wholly absent.¹³

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice issued a report that studied policing. The commission described police departments as "fragmented, complicated, and frequently overlapping," creating a country that had small police forces, each operating independently within the limits and jurisdiction of their imposed boundaries.¹⁴ It was the opinion of this commission the configuration of law enforcement was detrimental to producing effective results. The commission recommended greater coordination, the sharing of resources, consolidating specialized units and merging police services into one larger body or entity in some areas of the country.¹⁵

In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals issued a report on the overall improvement in delivery of police services for greater protection against crime. The commission believed there were too many police agencies in the United States, causing an inefficient and complex means of providing police

¹³ National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, *Wickersham Report*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), 124.

¹⁴ Daniel Skoler, *Progress in Policing: Essays in Change* (New York: Harper Press, 1980), 103-126.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

services.¹⁶ The commission suggested police jurisdictions consider combining services with other police departments or contemplate plans for total consolidation.¹⁷

In 2002, President George W. Bush's State of the Union address identified similar problems. He proclaimed the need for federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to work together to gather intelligence and share information in order to fight terrorism and bolster homeland security. President Bush identified a greater need for law enforcement to enhance agency-to-agency law enforcement coordination, communication, trust, and even consolidation of duties.¹⁸

In 2004, the 9/11 Commission published its findings, making several important observations regarding the limitations of local government. They implied that a disintegrated system of government was an impediment to properly responding to the terrorist attacks. While the commission did not specifically identify the local police structure as the main issue, the commission's analysis may be easily linked to problems associated with the lack of coordination among the many local governments.

- The lack of radio interoperability hindered proper coordination of police and fire personnel.
- The resources of local jurisdictions were overwhelmed where the hijacked airliners crashed.
- Mutual aid among public safety jurisdictions was limited due to the legal risks associated with indemnification and liability.
- Information and intelligence was not shared properly within the law enforcement community.¹⁹

B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The current American police model is outdated and does not provide local law enforcement the proper framework to effectively prevent, mitigate, and respond to terrorism. With nearly 18,000 separate police departments in the United States, the

¹⁶ National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Police* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., January 1973), 108-155.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ George W. Bush, State of the Union Address to Congress (January 29, 2002) available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20021029-11.html>, accessed on August 1, 2005.

¹⁹ Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 2004), 319-397.

current system of policing is individualized, fragmented and disconnected. With the proliferation of so many police organizations, contiguous agencies have overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities and job functions, leading to the waste of precious personnel resources. Exacerbating this issue, radio systems and computerized databases among these law enforcement agencies are dissimilar or not linked, prohibiting local cops from easily communicating. These technological gaps are the outcomes of the decentralized police model in existence today. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, local police must be configured in a manner to maximize the country's counterterrorism efforts.

As Americans have become more aware of terrorism and the possibility of future attacks, the demand for greater services in the form of enhanced security measures from their local police department has increased. Simultaneously, most levels of government are facing budget deficits, forcing them to tighten their belts, translating to a reduction of services. For most cities, police department costs are responsible for a high percentage of the municipal budget. During times of economic hardship, city leaders look for ways to reduce the cost of providing police services. Contrary to the idea of finding ways to reduce police costs, is the public demand for greater security from terrorism, as new equipment, training, and personnel are required to properly prevent and respond to terrorist acts. Financial restrictions that limit or reduce police resources strike at the very heart of the police consolidation debate as these mergers may make it possible for cities to actually increase services as a result of the savings incurred by consolidating. How will municipalities meet the public's expectation of increased security services in a climate of decreasing financial resources?

For the federal government, the answer to this question has unfolded. Consolidating existing agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United States Coast Guard, and the United States Secret Service created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The impetus to merge these federal departments came in the shadow of revelations that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not share information that may have

impeded the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. DHS now wants to provide management of intelligence information in order to ensure appropriate analysis and action is performed on incoming information among all organizations, synchronizing its counter terrorism efforts. By placing these organizations under a unified command, a long-term goal to enhance unity of effort and purpose was placed in motion.

For local law enforcement the answer is complicated. With limited resources and little expertise, most local police agencies do not have the ability to provide citizens with greater security against terrorists' organizations the likes of Hezbollah, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda. For these police departments, they may find what they are looking for in a consolidation with other police departments and the creation of a more centralized policing model.

The idea of merging municipal police departments to form one larger agency was conceived a long time ago. The movements toward consolidation come and go with economic cycles, changing social ideologies, and divergence in governmental leadership.²⁰ However, merging police departments for the purpose of preventing and protecting against terrorism has not been considered. For some government leaders the idea of combined municipal police departments to better serve a larger region is inevitable. Underscoring this sentiment, then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge told a group of municipal leaders in 1996 that they could no longer bury their heads in the sand and function as though the rest of the state, nation, and world did not exist. He explained to his reluctant audience that they must rid themselves of the mentality that supports the because-we-have-always-done-it-this-way ideology and urged them to lead through innovation and courage. Ridge suggested that the geographical borders that current municipal leaders hold sacred are undeniably artificial in the face of today's technological advances and global economy. At this summit, Ridge called for the restructuring of government into a regionalized format.²¹ Successfully protecting the United States from terrorism will depend, to a significant extent, the way the government

²⁰ Gary Halter, "City-City Consolidations in the United States," *National Civic Review*, Vol. 82 (May 1993).

²¹ Thomas L. Flannery, "Ridge Applauds Move toward Regionalism," *Sweet Liberty*, 1996, available at <http://sweetliberty.org/issues/regionalism./ridge.htm>, accessed on June 1, 2005.

organizes and structures itself to meet the threat.²² This thesis reviews the current policing model in the United States and the potential to alter it in order to maximize counter terrorism capabilities for the purpose of fighting terrorism.

C. THINKING ANEW

A viable model for the consolidation of police organizations may be drawn from the private sector. Corporations merge all of the time, consolidating to form one entity. They build on the individual strengths of the other while eliminating the weaknesses, fat, and overlap that each would produce as an individual company. A long list of banks, manufacturers, retailers, and telecommunications companies have followed a simple line of thinking: two companies with the same focus join forces to form one entity, ideally saving money, cutting overhead, trimming expenses, and producing a better product through synergy. Would it be possible for police departments to successfully do the same thing in order to fight terrorism?

The recently released National Preparedness Goal (NPG) by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is acknowledgements for the need to create a new framework in order to successfully achieve the nation's homeland security goals. DHS has established its national priorities as follows:

- Implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP).
- Expand regional collaboration.
- Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).
- Strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities.
- Strengthen interoperable communications capabilities.
- Strengthen CBRNE detection response and decontamination capabilities.
- Strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities.²³

As prescribed by three of the seven items on this list, DHS is desirous of having local governments increase prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities

²² Michael E. O'Hannon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I.M. Destler, David L. Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James B. Steinberg, *Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis* (Brookings Institute Press, Washington D.C.: 2002), 99.

²³ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Goal*, (Department of Homeland Security, December 2005), 14-20.

that have greater impact over an increased geographic area through the expansion of local cooperative efforts. The idea is to provide an increase of security capabilities that will benefit a greater number of people, impacting multiple communities.²⁴ Creating successful regional initiatives will require cooperation and collaboration between public agencies on an unprecedented level. When devising these strategies, leaders will be required to think anew. Consolidating local police departments or the merging of specific police services may be a way to increase counter terrorism capabilities. In a speech outlining the future agenda for DHS, Secretary Michael Chertoff quoted Abraham Lincoln to convey to his audience that fighting terrorism will require innovative thinking, resiliency, and change:

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.²⁵

D. TYPES OF CONSOLIDATION

There are a number of ways to consolidate local police resources. Consolidation is a matter of degree, depending upon the ultimate goals of the involved police departments. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has described the different types of police mergers in the following manner:

- Functional: Two or more agencies combine certain functional units, such as emergency communications, dispatch or records.
- Overlapping Jurisdictions: Agencies authorize each other's officers to pool resources and improve regional coverage, for example, permitting a city police officer to make arrests in the county and a sheriff's deputy to make arrests in the city.
- Public Safety: City or county governments may unite all police, fire, and emergency medical services agencies under one umbrella.
- Local Merger: Two separate police agencies form a single new entity. The agencies may be in small communities or metropolitan areas.

²⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Goal*, (Department of Homeland Security, December 2005), 14-20.

²⁵ Michael Chertoff, (remarks delivered to the Commonwealth Club, July 28, 2005), available at http://www.infragard.net/press_room/releases/chertoff_072805.htm, accessed on July 30, 2005.

- Regional: A number of agencies combine to provide police services to a geographic area.
- Metropolitan: Two or more agencies serving overlapping jurisdictions join forces to become one agency serving an entire metropolitan area.
- Government: A city and adjoining county consolidate their entire governments, creating a metro form of government for all citizens.²⁶

While many mergers do not fit perfectly into these categories, the IACP guidelines assist in understanding the most common arrangements that are made between police organizations. The following examples provide context to the IACP list of possible configurations.

The Las Vegas Nevada Metropolitan Police Department was formed through combining the Clark County Sheriff's Department with the municipal police department of Las Vegas on July 1, 1973.²⁷ Today, this police department serves the City of Las Vegas, boasting a population well over 1 million that encompasses 53 square miles. An elected sheriff leads the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, serving a term of four years, while an appointed police commission approves this police department's budget.²⁸ The consolidation of these two entities was conducted by the Nevada State Legislature resulting from an outgrowth of the county and city governments offering overlapping services. This consolidation allowed for an increase of police services and elimination of duplication in area law enforcement, promoting efficiency and effectiveness in a large metropolitan area.

One of the most significant consolidation of police agencies occurred in Canada. In 1974, the Peel Regional Police were formed after the incorporation of the former police departments of Mississauga, Port Credit, Streetsville, Brampton, and Chinguacousy.²⁹ Today, this police force is the second largest municipal agency in the

²⁶ International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach" (May 2003), 1-2.

²⁷ Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, "Consolidation of the Las Vegas Police Department and Clark County Sheriff's Department", available at <http://www.lvmpd.com/overview/ovrcons.htm>, accessed on November 30, 2005.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Peel Regional Police Department, "History of the Peel Regional Police Department," available at <http://www.peelpolice.on.ca>, accessed on June 7, 2005.

Province of Ontario with over 2,000 full time employees, serving a population of over 950,000. The formation of this regional police department occurred as a result of the creation of the Regional Municipality of Peel, bringing all of the different city and county entities under one governmental structure.³⁰ At the time this occurred, the idea of merging services and entire governments was an accepted mainstream solution to reducing costs within Canada.

The State of California saw the cities of Larkspur and Corte Madera consolidate their individual police departments into the Twin Cities Police Authority in January of 1980.³¹ The merger of these city police departments was the first in the state's history. The Twin Cities Police Authority serves a citizenry of 21,000 with forty-four full time employees who provide full service policing to a geographic area of eight square miles. Larkspur and Corte Madera are located just eleven miles north of San Francisco. The City of Larkspur and the Town of Corte Madera each provide two members of its elected council to form a four-member group that is responsible for policy development and oversight for their police force.³² The police authority was established through a joint powers agreement and its impetus was the desire to provide greater coordination, cooperation, and sharing in relation to police services.³³ The consolidation quickly took action on this desire, as it formed a much needed traffic unit to properly mitigate an increasing traffic problem each city shared.

In 1992, the City of Charlotte and the County of Mecklenburg combined police services between the existing city and county agencies.³⁴ This police department consists of nearly 2,000 employees, serving 193 square miles and a population of nearly 700,000, covering the cities of Cornelius, Charlotte, Davidson, Huntersville, Mathews, Mint Hill,

³⁰ Peel Regional Police Department, "History of the Peel Regional Police Department," available at <http://www.peelpolice.on.ca>, accessed on June 7, 2005.

³¹ Phillip D. Green, "Life after Consolidation: Traffic Enforcement Issues," *The Siren*, December 1984, available at <http://www.ci.larkspur.ca.us/3070.html>, accessed on June 7, 2005.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, *About Us*, available at <http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/Police/About+Us/Home.htm>, accessed on June 1, 2005.

and Pineville.³⁵ This is not an example of organizational consolidation, but of successfully merged police services. Through carefully constructed contracts, the county sheriff and municipal police eradicated duplicate responsibilities and created a more efficient public safety partnership. Today, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department is the largest police force between Washington, D.C. and Atlanta, Georgia.

³⁵Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, *About Us*, available at <http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/Police/About+Us/Home.htm>, accessed on June 1, 2005.

E. THESIS METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this research combines:

- A review and analysis of the major issues surrounding police consolidation.
- Two panel interviews with groups having law enforcement expertise organized within the context of a Nominal Group Technique (NGT).
- A subject matter expert interview.
- A case study of an existing consolidated police service model in Los Angeles County.

This methodology is intended to assess the potential for local police consolidation or police service merger, determining if it is a more viable model to fight terrorism for local police departments.

The first chapter introduces the area of study, while identifying the need for local police to become more involved in the war on terrorism. This chapter outlines the American police model as a structural hindrance to providing the best possible defense to fight terrorism.

The second chapter provides a review of the major issues concerning law enforcement mergers. It illuminates the advantages and disadvantages associated with merging police agencies and/or consolidating police services. Understanding the themes in this chapter builds a foundation for evaluating the possibility of consolidating local police to create a more comprehensive framework to fight terrorism.

The third chapter summarizes the results from panel interviews conducted within the format of a NGT. These group discussions comprised a diverse group of professionals with law enforcement expertise providing different perspectives to the area of study. The group consisted of two Los Angeles County police chiefs, an elected city councilperson from the City of Pasadena, a captain from the California Highway Patrol, an attorney specializing in police litigation, a vice-president of a California-based utilities company in charge of security, and a professor from California State University, Los Angeles, who served as a member on the Commission on Police Standards and Training in California.

The fourth chapter focuses on the issue of local control. From the current literature and panel interviews, it is clear this is the most controversial and compelling

argument against the merging of police resources. This chapter analyzes this issue in relation to the results of the Kansas City Preventative Patrol experiment and several citizen satisfaction surveys from past mergers.

The fifth chapter is a case study of the Foothill Air Support Team (FAST). FAST combines eight municipal police departments operating under a joint powers agreement to provide airborne support to its members for the dual purpose of fighting crime and terrorism. Operating in Los Angeles County FAST provides a template to meet the challenges of expanding local counter terrorism capabilities established by DHS. The model turns theory into practice, demonstrating how consolidation may bolster the counter terrorism apparatus of local law enforcement.

The final chapter provides a summary, three policy options, and a recommendation to alter police services as a means to fight terrorism. It incorporates an interview with Assistant Chief David Stephens of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, a subject matter expert in police mergers.

F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

There is no current literature that explicitly suggests that police consolidation or police service mergers may be a means to enable local law enforcement to be a more formidable force to fight terrorism. This thesis will be the first research in this area. Data culled from this work will be utilized in order to conduct a policy options analysis for law enforcement professionals to consider, making the results of this research exportable nationally.

II. MAJOR ISSUES IN POLICE CONSOLIDATION

A. FISCAL IMPACT

For proponents of police consolidation, the most formidable argument in favor of merging resources is contained within the idea of cost savings. For the most part, those who have researched the merging of police departments have discovered some sort of financial advantage to this centralized police model. However, it appears there is no consensus within the literature as it provides a dichotomy of results.

A consolidated police feasibility study was undertaken for the cities of Bell, Bell Gardens, Commerce, Cudahy, and Vernon in 1980. These cities are located in the Los Angeles basin, approximately ten miles from the City of Los Angeles. At the time of this review, the Bell, Bell Gardens, and Vernon operated independent police departments, while Commerce and Cudahy contracted with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. The conclusion of the study recommended that these cities consolidate to form a single police department.³⁶ The findings of the report projected the new merged police department would possess more patrol officers and more detective personnel, develop new specialized units, and save enough money to hire additional civilian employees to support more effective and economical police services.³⁷

This study suggested the departments would be able to eliminate overlapping assignments (i.e., K-9, crime prevention and background officers) by centralizing such units into one agency. The report studied the service demands in all of the cities and determined the workload did not support the need for each city to assign officers to a number of specific assignments.³⁸ The additional officers would be sent to the patrol or detective sections, increasing personnel and services. With additional officers, a specialized crime prevention unit was theorized to provide greater community contact and educational programs in the area of home and building security, drug intervention, and driver safety. Several administrative positions such as police chief, commander, and

³⁶ John P. Kennedy, Gary B. Adams, Gennaro F. Vito, "Consolidation of Police Services: An Opportunity for Innovation," *National Civic Review*, Vol. 10 (1982): 467.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

captain would be consolidated in this merger of the five cities. The reduction of personnel costs at the top of the organization would theoretically provide funding for the hiring of civilian support personnel. The study projected that the increase in civilians would allow police officers to spend more time on the street, resulting in a lower crime rate.³⁹

In 1997, a study compared the operational costs of the Northern York Regional Police Department (Pennsylvania) to the same number of independent municipal police agencies in a neighboring county. The research identified the operational costs for the merged department to be 28% lower than the aggregate operational costs of the individual police departments used in the comparison.⁴⁰ Additionally, the number of police officers per 1,000 residents was 34% lower, yet the regional police department was found to offer more services (K-9, detectives, and juvenile specialists), greater professional opportunities and increased salaries to its employees.⁴¹

In a preliminary analysis published in 2005 for the possible law enforcement consolidation between the City of Indianapolis and Marion County (Indiana), data culled from these departments suggested a police merger would reduce overtime expenditures for each entity.⁴² The report formulated deployment models by combining the existing personnel resources from the independent agencies and demonstrated the ability for the merger to fill gaps in scheduling, reducing the amount of overtime spent. The report concluded that the cost savings from reduced overtime was substantial as the police departments being merged were understaffed and relied upon overtime to fill vacant positions.⁴³ This preliminary report suggested other areas of fiscal savings relating to liability. The report suggested that a decrease in the number of high profile operational units equaled a reduction in the likelihood of incidents that bring lawsuits. The analysis

³⁹ Kennedy et al., "Consolidation of Police Services," 467.

⁴⁰ John T. Krimmel, "The Northern York County Police Consolidation Experience: An Analysis of the Consolidation of Police Services in Eight Pennsylvania Rural Communities," *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* (1997), 497-507.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Wabash Scientific, Inc., "Indianapolis/Marion County: Law Enforcement Consolidation: Phase I Preliminary Report," (August 19, 2005), 24.

⁴³ Wabash Scientific, "Indianapolis/Marion County," 15.

projected lower insurance rates and decreasing workers compensation claims due to the sheer reduction in risk associated with liability.

The fiscal savings derived through consolidation appears to be relative to the involved agency's budget. While an estimated \$3.6 million was projected to be saved annually in the consolidation between Indianapolis and Marion,⁴⁴ the smaller consolidation study between police in the City of St. Mary's and Camden County, (Georgia) in 2004 was estimated to be \$673,775 each year.⁴⁵ For both, the monetary savings is attributed to the consolidation of management, facilities, support services, personnel benefits, and the elimination of redundant duties at the line level. While the savings appeared to be more in Indiana, it was equal to the amount saved in Georgia, relative to the total budgets of the independent police departments being reviewed.

While savings is projected under most police consolidations, it may be a short-term result. There is evidence that law enforcement services over a longer period of time suffer cost increases that lead to "diseconomies of scale."

Economies of scale occur when mass-producing a good or service results in a lower average cost. With the elimination of personnel in redundant assignments through consolidation, police departments are theoretically able to reduce overall costs while increasing services and/or providing the same services to a larger number of citizens, initiating economies of scale, enjoying reduced costs. However, if service demands increase over time, requiring additional police officers, the cost for services increases. If output does not increase in a commensurate fashion with cost, diseconomies of scale occur, eliminating the cost savings achieved through consolidation. If consolidation cost savings is to be used to bolster local law enforcement personnel resources to better fight terrorism, it is pertinent to understand this economic premise and the possible limitations that may exist. This issue is difficult to analyze, as police services are difficult to measure in economic terms. The research in this area is ambiguous. A study concluded

⁴⁴ Wabash Scientific, "Indianapolis/Marion County," 9.

⁴⁵ Carl Vinson Institute of Government, "A Study of the Potential for Outsourcing Police Services in the City of St. Mary's" (July 29, 2004), 8.

in 1975 established the idea that police services enjoyed economies of scale,⁴⁶ but studies conducted in 1987 and 1990 refuted the earlier study with a more comprehensive methodology, providing data showing police services experiencing diseconomies of scale over the long run.⁴⁷⁻⁴⁸ This is an important issue, as it suggests there are limits to expanding police services throughout a region before costs for services begin a return to pre-consolidation levels.

Transition costs are the one-time expenditures directly related to the actual consolidation and most commonly fall in the category of communication devices (computers and radios), uniforms, vehicles, equipment, training, and facilities. While financial savings may occur when police departments consolidate, the transition costs are commonly overlooked or miscalculated, off-setting the net savings.⁴⁹ In the consolidation between the police departments in the City of Louisville and Jefferson County, Indiana, transition costs were greatly underestimated.⁵⁰ Radio infrastructure required replacement at the cost of \$50 million, along with facility refurbishment totaling \$2.5 million.⁵¹ For the city-county consolidation of the City of Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana, the single transition cost of vehicle standardization was estimated to be a whopping \$3.2 million.⁵² Opponents of consolidation suggested that these one-time costs are usually underestimated and reduce or completely eliminate the savings projected under merged departments.⁵³

⁴⁶ Jeffrey L. Chapman, Werner Z. Hirsch, and Sidney Sonenblum, "Crime Prevention, the Police Production and Budgeting," *Public Finance*, Vol. 30, no.2 (1975): 197-215.

⁴⁷ Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, "Economies of Scale in Municipal Police Departments: The Case in Florida," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 69, no.2 (1988): 352-356.

⁴⁸ Anthony O. Gyapont and Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, "Factor Substitution, Price Elasticity of Demand and Returns to Scale in Police Production: Evidence from Michigan," *Southern Economic Journal*, Vol. 15, no. 2 (1990): 863-878.

⁴⁹ Wabash, "Indianapolis/Marion County," 16.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid. 19.

⁵³ Ibid. 16.

B. EXPERIENCE AND PROFESSIONALISM

Of the nearly 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States, 52% employ fewer than ten full-time police officers, 31% employ fewer than five full-time police officers and 11% employ only one full-time police officer.⁵⁴ These jurisdictions serve small populations and are not exposed to many of the complex criminal, political, or socially challenging issues facing larger police agencies. As a result, the police officers and civilian employees associated with these smaller agencies are less likely to develop expertise in many of the fields that counterparts achieve in larger police departments.⁵⁵ Combining smaller police departments via consolidation exposes small city police employees to a larger geographical area, which provides greater exposure to specialized assignments, larger populations, diverse citizens, and more complex situations, creating a more experienced and professional police department over time.⁵⁶

C. INCREASED CRIME FIGHTING CAPABILITIES

The invisible boundaries erected by governments that separate one jurisdiction from another do not halt the movement of crime. Persons who break the law move from city to city, allowing the opportunity to lead them to their next victim. As transportation corridors have connected urban centers to surrounding suburbs, criminals have become regional in nature, creating a more complex problem for law enforcement. It is not uncommon for a series of robberies or burglaries to involve victims from a variety of municipalities. Under the decentralized police model, individual police agencies investigate such serial crimes without detecting the existing crime pattern.

Criminal activity moves from location to location, depending on the level of law enforcement resources assigned to combat it along with the level of intensity applied.⁵⁷ As crime increases in a specific area of a city, police usually respond with greater measures to eliminate it. While some suspects are arrested, the criminal element is not

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, *Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 2000* (October 2002), 3.

⁵⁵ Wabash, "Indianapolis/Marion County," 55.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Calvin McNeil, "Police Protection and the Spatial Concentration of Crime: Evidence from Los Angeles," Graduate Thesis, San Diego State University (May 2000), 5-6.

completely eradicated. In fact, crime is usually relocated to another portion of the beat, city, county or adjacent jurisdictions where the probability of arrest is lowest and police resources are disproportionately allocated.⁵⁸ Terrorists, like other criminals, are able to exploit this weakness. Police resources would be more effective if they were deployed in a regional fashion, evenly concentrated to deter criminal activity.⁵⁹ As terrorists operate in a network fashion, they utilize cells of people to coordinate different tasks of any given operation.⁶⁰ It would seem, “whoever masters the network form stands to gain the advantage.”⁶¹

If such a terrorist network were spread over several municipalities, local jurisdictions would have a difficult if not impossible job connecting the dots and preventing a terrorist attack. A consolidation of police agencies provides a strategy that evens out the distribution of resources and matches the network operation of criminals and terrorists. Merging police organizations, or specific services, begins the process of network policing in order to properly format law enforcement resources in order to fight terrorism.

D. LOCAL CONTROL

While consolidation may offer a fiscal savings, opponents contend such compensation is not enough for communities to forfeit control of their police. They suggest that small police agencies are more responsive to citizens and provide services tailored to meet the needs of smaller communities, adding great value to police services that community members do not want to relinquish. With consolidation, local citizens and politicians are perceived to have a diminished role in the decision making process, as the larger consolidated agency has an increased number of stakeholders, a more diverse list of issues to handle, and additional layers of bureaucracy, creating an atmosphere of disenfranchisement between police and locals.⁶² A police department that is responsible for a larger geographic area is required to make decisions based upon the good of the

⁵⁸ McNeil, “Police Protection,” 6-7.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* (Arlington: RAND, 2001), 16.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Sinden, “Issues.”

entire region, versus the good of the individual neighborhood or local politico.⁶³ With consolidation, local community interests have the potential to become blurry, as the merged police department focuses on the entire region. The issue of local control is the dominating argument by opponents of police mergers. The NGT process conducted for this research confirmed the importance of this issue and as a result, Chapter IV was created to further explore and analyze this important topic.

E. EMPLOYEE DISCONTENT

Most employees are comfortable with the status quo. Introducing different ideas and alternative ways of doing things creates discomfort for most workers. The consolidation of police departments places a great strain on employees as changes occur within the organization. As police agencies undergo the process of a merger, cultures clash as different philosophies, ideals, values, and personalities begin forging together.⁶⁴ Any merger can be foiled by the fusion of incompatible cultures as it disrupts the everyday business of the police department.⁶⁵ If not managed properly, these internal problems can negate the goals that consolidation is attempting to achieve.

Organized employee police unions have resisted supporting consolidation efforts due to the varied benefit packages that exist among neighboring police agencies. Police association leadership fears a reduction in salary, benefits, and other working condition issues that directly impact their membership.⁶⁶ They believe managers will be desirous of utilizing the lowest possible salary and benefit ranges when consolidating organizations in order to achieve a savings.

The next chapter summarizes two panel interviews conducted within the structure of a Nominal Group Technique (NGT). Each of the panels was asked to consider a more centralized police model and whether or not it provided greater protection from terrorism. Data from these panels is utilized to create three future outcomes for consideration.

⁶³ Sam Staley, "Bigger is Not Better: The Virtues of Decentralized Local Government," CATO Institute Policy Analysis, No.166 (January 21, 1992) available at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-166.html>, accessed on July 4, 2005.

⁶⁴ Roberto A. Weber and Colin F. Camerer, "Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach," *Management Science*, Vol. 49, no. 4 (April 2003): 400-415.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Sinden, "Issues."

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III. NOMINAL GROUP TECHNIQUE

A. INTRODUCTION

A nominal group technique (NGT) is a structured workshop that brings together panelists in order to identify trends and events as they relate to the topic of discussion. A facilitator, or third party, ushers the panel through this process, assists in the clarification of any information, lends insight to discussion, and ensures that the group does not stray from its intended purpose. As a part of the NGT, each participant provides information, from his or her perspective, on the topic. Panelists are asked not to be judgmental or provide commentary when others are providing input. Prior to any group discussions, the panel is provided with a description of the issue, the definition of a trend and an event, along with an overview of the NGT process. After a brainstorming of ideas, the group is then allowed to discuss each of the panelist's statements and provide clarifying information if necessary. A ranking of the ideas follows and an order of importance and magnitude of each is established. Similar processes have proven to be a viable technique for police organizations to utilize when attempting to forecast specific issues the agency may face in the future.⁶⁷

For the purposes of this thesis, two panels were convened. The first group represented an integrated group of seven professionals with experience in the fields of business, education, law, law enforcement, and politics. The second one consisted of six law enforcement officers from diverse backgrounds and ranks with over 100 years of combined police experience. The topic of discussion or question asked to each panel member was: "Is police consolidation or the merger of specific police services a more effective and efficient means to combat terrorism than the current decentralized police model?" Each of the groups was asked to consider this question when identifying trends and events as part of the NGT exercise.

For the purposes of these panel discussions, a trend was defined as something that had social, technological, economic, environmental, or political characteristics and may

⁶⁷ William Tafoya, "A Delphi Forecast of the Future of Law Enforcement" (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1986).

be measured or estimated over a period of time. The participants were told to think of trends as occurrences with gradual and long term characteristics. An event was defined as something that occurred at a specific time and date. The panels were told that events were unambiguous, confirmable and had the potential to change future. It was explained that events were different than trends, as events were singular incidents and did not reoccur.⁶⁸

1. Interpreting the Trend Table

For each trend identified, the panelists were asked to assign the arbitrary score of 100, which represented a baseline measurement and the current state of the trend. After this was established, the panelists were asked to evaluate the direction of each trend five years in the past, along with five and ten years in the future, assigning a number that was either lower or higher than the established baseline (100).

In the example below (Table 1), the first trend, or Tr-1, is viewed as doubling in five years to 200 and then increasing to 250 in ten years from its current baseline of 100. Additionally, Tr-1 is perceived to be fifty, or only half the value, when comparing it five years in the past (-5) to the established baseline today. Thus, the first trend in the example table is viewed as constantly increasing over a twenty-year period. The second trend, Tr-2, was twice as high (200) five years ago when comparing it to the baseline of today (100). This second trend decreases in veracity to seventy-five and then to twenty-five five and ten years in the future, respectively. Tr-2 is observed to be constantly decreasing over time.

Table 1. Example Trend Table

| Trend (Tr) | -5 years (past) | Today (baseline) | +5 years (future) | +10 years (future) | Concern Level (1-10) |
|------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Tr-1 | 50 | 100 | 200 | 250 | 9 |
| Tr-2 | 200 | 100 | 75 | 25 | 5 |

Last, the panel members were asked to provide an individual concern level for each trend, as it related to the issue or question being asked. Utilizing numbers between one and ten (one for a low concern level and ten for a high concern level), the panel measured the perceived impact of the trend on the issue being discussed. The higher number posted in the concern level reflected the participant's opinion that the trend

⁶⁸ Tom Esenten, Lecture, California Police Officer Standards and Training, Command College Class #33, Lecture (San Marcos, California, November 2001).

would have great impact, while the lower number suggested the idea that the trend would have little or no effect. The example table depicts a high concern level with a measurement of nine.

2. Interpreting the Event Table

For each event identified, the panelists were asked to project the first year when they felt the event had a 1% chance of occurrence. After this was established, the participants were asked to estimate the event's probability of occurrence, as a percentage, by assigning a value between 0 to 100%, for five (+5) and ten years (+10) in the future. Last, the panelists were required to identify the impact of each event by the issuance of a number between -10 and +10, with the highest positive number having the greatest impact and the highest negative number having the least impact to the issue being discussed.

In the example below (Table 2), the first event, or Ev-1, is perceived to be initially possible in three years. The example table shows the probability of Ev-1 increasing to 50% in five years and becoming a certainty, or 100%, over the course of ten years. This table also indicates the second event, or Ev-2, is projected to have its first possibility of occurrence in seven years, making Ev-2's occurrence in five years a 0% probability. However, in ten years Ev-2 has a 10% probability of occurrence.

Table 2. Example Event Table

| Event (Ev) | Year(s) > 0 (1 st year possible) | +5 years (future) | +10 years (future) | Impact -10 to +10 |
|------------|--|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Ev-1 | 3 | 50% | 100% | -8 |
| Ev-2 | 7 | 0 | 10% | +8 |

The impact of Ev-1 in the example table is rated -8. This number is interpreted to mean the event has little or no impact on the issue being studied. However, Ev-2 in this example is rated as having great impact, as it was issued a score of +8.

3. Interpreting the Cross Impact Analysis Table

The panels were asked to assess each event and its impact on every trend, providing a cross-impact analysis. Participants provided input for this analysis through discussion and eventual assignment of a numeric value depicting each impact. If the panelists provided the number of zero, it meant that they perceived the event had no impact on the trend. If they believed that the event had a positive impact (judged as "good") on the trend, a positive number ranging from one to five was assigned with the

higher number indicating the more positive impact of the event on the trend. If the panelists believed that the event had a negative impact (judged as “bad”) on the trend, a number ranging from –1 to –5 were assigned with the higher number indicating the more negative impact of the event on the trend. In the example below (Table 3), Ev-1 is measured as having no impact on Tr-1, but having the highest possible positive impact on Tr-2. Ev-2 is depicted as having a slight positive impact on Tr-1 and the greatest possible negative impact on Tr-2.

Table 3. Example Cross Impact Analysis Table

| | Tr-1 | Tr-2 |
|------|------|------|
| Ev-1 | 0 | 5 |
| Ev-2 | 1 | -5 |

This portion of the analysis is highly subjective and may be viewed differently depending upon point of view. The panels’ trends and events were tabulated to reflect the average values associated with each. This accumulated information allowed for the easy identification of divergent views and areas of congruence among the participants.

B. PROFESSIONAL PANEL RESULTS

1. Trends

The professional panel identified twenty-five trends. The panel ranked five of these as being the most significant. These five trends are designated as Tr-1 through Tr-5 and are summarized in Table 4. A synopsis of the panel discussion for each of the trends is provided below.

Table 4. Trends (Professional Panel)

| Trend (Tr) | -5 years | Today | +5 years | +10 years | Concern Level (1-10) |
|---|----------|-------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| Tr-1 | 71 | 100 | 157 | 255 | 8 |
| Tr-2 | 85 | 100 | 120 | 122 | 5 |
| Tr-3 | 95 | 100 | 102 | 91 | 10 |
| Tr-4 | 75 | 100 | 125 | 150 | 8 |
| Tr-5 | 90 | 100 | 138 | 175 | 5 |
| Tr-1= Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs. Tr-2= Liability exposure for law enforcement. Tr-3= Desire to have local control of police. Tr-4= Cost of police personnel. Tr-5= Level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry. | | | | | |

The first trend (Tr-1) identified by the panel was “resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs.” The panel believed that cities have increased their awareness to the benefits of joining forces. Participants agreed that cities working in unison have the potential to gain greater political clout, reduce cost with less

duplication, and increase purchasing power in the market place. The panel felt that over the next five and ten years, municipalities would increase the trend of resource sharing from today's baseline of 100 to 157 and 255, respectively. The participants rated the concern level of this trend at a high level (8) and observed that resource sharing would have a direct impact on the development of a consolidated municipal police department or the sharing of specific police services in the future. One of the panelists used a recent example of his city joining with three others to purchase a power production facility out of state to ensure a consistent flow of electricity to citizens. Another panelist suggested that resource sharing would happen incrementally and often. This person explained how politicians, city managers, and citizens will use this strategy, become familiar with its successes and, as he stated, "After traveling down this road, the city will turn around and look what has been accomplished with such cooperative efforts and realize that there is no way to go back." This panelist suggested that this would eventually lead to the acceptance of merging services or even consolidating municipal police departments. One of the private sector panelists explained how consumers would drive the phenomenon of merged police departments. He believed that resource-sharing will increase as consumers will want "one-stop shopping," and will have a desire to cut back on the duplication of government services and overall bureaucracy.

The second trend (Tr-2) identified by the panel was "liability exposure for law enforcement." The participants all observed this issue as increasing, slightly, issuing this trend a score of 120 in five years and 122 in ten years from the baseline of 100. The concern level of this trend and its impact on a consolidated police force was only ranked as moderate (5). However, the panel was clearly split on this issue. One group supported the idea that a consolidated police force would create consistency in the areas of training, policy implementation, and operations along with an effective tool to communicate information. The group thought these advantages would devise an agency that decreased its exposure to liability. The other group argued that the creation of a larger police entity would make it more difficult to implement accountability, leadership, vision, and establishing proper day-to-day procedures. This group thought the larger agency would increase police liability due to these difficulties.

The third trend (Tr-3) identified by the group was “the desire to have local control of police.” The panel believed there would be a very small increase in this trend over a five-year period, increasing from the baseline of 100 to a mere 102. However, they believed this trend would eventually decrease in a ten-year period to 91. During the discussion, the participants agreed that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, along with greater acceptance and successes of the sharing of resources (Tr-1) by municipalities would cause a shift in thinking for politicians and the public. The group theorized that a larger police department with more resources would offer greater prevention against terrorism and bring greater services to the public. One of the participants disagreed. This panelist is a local politician and his perspective was much different from the members of the group. This participant said it was his belief that community members would want their own police department and not want to become a member of a larger consolidated agency. It was his opinion that citizens would place great pressure on elected officials to oppose mergers in order to retain individual police departments and the citizens’ rights to direct local resources. This panelist said the merger of police departments was contrary to the ideals of community policing and the goals of increasing citizen-police relationships. He explained that a larger police agency would result in less access, contact, and collaboration with police officials. This trend was clearly controversial, with the concern level being established at the highest level (10).

The fourth trend (Tr-4) identified by this panel was “the cost of police personnel.” The group was cohesive on this trend as it described the increasing personnel costs in the law enforcement profession and the decreasing ability for a city to increase its revenue. The panel scored the trend as 75 five years ago, and 125 five years in the future, escalating to 150 ten years. Tr-4 showed a continuing increase over the course of the entire twenty-year period. The panel discussed increasing interest rates, the high price of gasoline, reduced desire of citizens to pay greater taxes, and the average city’s inability to generate revenue through business growth initiatives. They described an inverse relationship between the cost of police personnel and the revenue generated by municipal governments. The participants’ concern level for this trend was very high (8), as they believed the impetus to form a consolidated police department would come directly from the need to reduce costs. Each of the panelists agreed that approximately 90% of the

expense to provide police services involved personnel costs. One of the local police chiefs on the panel stated the cost of his city's retirement had increased by 23% over the course of two years due to increased retirement plans. He stated the escalating retirement costs may cause some municipalities to seek contract or shared services, which could quickly turn into some sort of merged effort.

The fifth trend (Tr-5) identified by the participants was "the level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry." The panelists specifically noted the increased number of citizens who speak multiple languages and have different cultural norms, a continually increasing Hispanic population, and the need to provide specialized services to an exploding population of elderly. The participants believed that community members have become less homogeneous than in the past and will continue to get more complex and diverse. The panel calculated that demands on police services would increase from a baseline of 100 to 138 in five years and increase to 175 in ten years. The panel suggested the growing diversity of the citizens would place greater demands on law enforcement as police personnel would have to become familiar with a variety of languages, customs, and other special needs. All but one of the panelists rated the concern level of this trend as moderate (5) to the impact of a consolidated police force. The individual panelist who perceived this trend differently was a professional in the private sector who had experience dealing with many entities on a regional basis with his company's service. This panelist believed that a more regionalized police department allowed for greater resources in the area of language and cultural diversification along with increased abilities to provide more innovative ideas to deal with a change in the age demographic. The idea from this panelist centered on synergy and the philosophy that input from more people would bring greater solutions. He also believed that a consolidation of police agencies would create a larger pool of employees who would provide a diversity match to the citizens being served, making the police department more adaptable to the coming demographic changes.

2. Events

The professional panel identified twenty-five events they felt would change the future and possibly lead to the development of consolidated police departments or increased service mergers. The panel ranked five of these as being the most significant.

These five events are designated as Ev-1 through Ev-5 and are summarized in Table 5. A synopsis of the panel discussion surrounding each event is provided below.

Table 5. Events (Professional Panel)

| Event (Ev) | Year(s) > 0 | +5 years | +10 years | Impact –10 to +10 |
|---|-------------|----------|-----------|-------------------|
| Ev-1 | 1 | 100% | 100% | +9 |
| Ev-2 | 12 | 0% | 0% | +5 |
| Ev-3 | 2 | 24% | 47% | +7 |
| Ev-4 | 4 | 13% | 33% | +3 |
| Ev-5 | 9 | 0% | 4% | +10 |
| Ev-1=A second large terrorist attack on the United States. Ev-2=A catastrophic natural disaster. Ev-3=A catastrophic communication failure between police departments. Ev-4=An open border with Mexico. Ev-5=Police officers forming a statewide union. | | | | |

The first event (Ev-1) that was identified by the group was “a second large-scale terrorist attack on the United States.” The participants felt that the United States would be subjected to more terrorist attacks in the future. During the discussion, the panelists described the environment of Israel and the way individual suicide bombers infiltrate public areas and kill themselves and Israeli citizens. The entire group believed that America would be subjected to daily attacks and eventually a very large plot, much like the one that occurred on September 11, 2001. It was the consensus of the participants that the adversarial ideals of freedom and security would be the greatest weakness the country would face in its fight against future terrorist acts. The panel members believed that Ev-1 had at least a 1% probability of occurring within the next one or two years and a 100% chance of occurring within the next five years, making it a 100% chance of occurrence in ten years as well. The group explained that Ev-1 would have a great impact on the initiation of creating a more centralized policing model to combat the tide of terrorism. The participants explained that individualized law enforcement agencies would struggle to prevent and respond to a major terrorist attack. The group decided the occurrence of another large terrorist attack would force law enforcement agencies to collaborate and join forces in order to overcome the numerous impacts of such an event. It was theorized that police collaboration over this event would demonstrate the effectiveness of such a centralized police model, creating a desire to join forces on a permanent basis. The panel rated the impact of this event to be significant in the development of a regional police force. The panel demonstrated their strong feelings of this event’s impact with a score of +9.

The second event (Ev-2) the panel identified was “another catastrophic natural disaster.” Members of the panel described the impacts of Katrina and the failure of local government to provide for the safety of citizens before, during, and after the event. The group believed city officials failed to properly manage local police resources, leading to further challenges remaining in the area. The participants in the discussion believed a second disaster of this magnitude would force municipalities to investigate a better means to provide public safety. They spoke of a future earthquake with the magnitude to cause long-term electricity scarcity, water and food shortages, and transportation stoppages, along with short/long-term communication impediments. The participants displayed a great amount of variance in their anticipated timeline for such a natural disaster to occur. The first years of probability ranged from one, three, five, five, ten, ten, and fifty years among the panelists. They addressed these diverse scores by describing nature as unpredictable, with a catastrophic event having the ability to occur at any time. They thought the range of scores was easily explained as each of them considered the difficulty in predicting such an event. As a result of the wide range of scores, the panel’s average first year for probability of occurrence for this event was twelve years, resulting in a zero probability within the five and ten year time span. An interesting discussion took place regarding the impact of such a disaster on the formation of a consolidated police force. The two police chiefs on the panel believed that the occurrence of Ev-2 would cause such great strain on local citizens that municipal police departments would be forever left as a decentralized police model since citizens would fear not having their own exclusive police department and resources they could rely upon. The other panel members believed the opposite, and identified Ev-2 much like Ev-1, as a galvanizing force for the initiation of a regional policing effort. Consequently, the impact level of Ev-2 was considered moderate, as the group was split on this topic.

The third event (Ev-3) identified by the group was “a catastrophic communication failure between police departments.” On a day-to-day basis, the panel felt that law enforcement did not communicate effectively with each other. Some examples were noted where a crime occurred across jurisdictional boundaries and several police agencies working together on a case had not received all of the necessary information from each other. The participants felt that a very important incident (i.e., a criminal investigation,

terrorist act, or localized emergency) would occur where it would be imperative for several law enforcement agencies to communicate information, share intelligence, and routinely organize themselves to be effective to complete the task at hand. The panel felt such an incident would present itself, and based on a sordid history of poor communication between agencies, the involved police departments would fail miserably and cause the loss of life and destruction of property, causing public confidence in the decentralized police model to become wanting. One of the panel members noted the communication failure between federal law enforcement agencies before September 11, 2001. He explained further by telling the group of the 9/11 Commission findings that these agencies did not share information that may have been able to stop the attacks. The panel member felt the consolidation of federal law enforcement under the umbrella of DHS would be mimicked by local police if such a failure was attributed to them. The panel was fairly consistent in its timeline of occurrence, indicating that such an event had a 24% possibility of occurrence within two years and a probability of 47% in the next ten years. The panel rated the overall impact of Ev-3 as high (7). However, one of the panelists, a local politician, did not feel that the impact of Ev-3 would be quite as daunting. His rationale was his understanding of technological advances and current efforts that would make communication failures less and less common. He noted the initiatives at all levels of government to fund interoperability among municipalities to increase interagency communications. He explained that the concept of radio interoperability would connect groups of police agencies together on one radio channel. This panelist scored the impact for this event very low, resulting in a lower average for the overall impact score.

The fourth event (Ev-4) identified by the group was “an open border with Mexico.” The panel was very diverse in its time measurement of when such an event would have an initial chance of occurrence. From a high of ten years to a low of one year, the panel produced an average score of four years. The participants visualized Ev-4 increasing to a probability of 13% in five years and 33% in ten years. The discussion from the group was centered on free trade, terrorism, and the need for California to maintain its migrant work force. At the end of the conversation, the panel came to realize that the diversity in the numbers they assigned to this event was a direct result of

understanding that Ev-4 may be possible or impossible depending upon the political environment. The panel had varying opinions of when this would happen based upon how they currently view the political landscape. The impact assessment of Ev-4 by the group was low (+3). This low impact assessment was the result of not knowing the circumstances by which the decision to open the border would be made. In other words, the group would be inclined to raise their assessment of the impact of Ev-4 if it occurred as a result of a terrorist act or other incident related to public safety. The group would lower its assessment score of Ev-4 if it occurred as a result of economics or politics.

The fifth event (Ev-5) identified was “police officers forming a statewide union.” As the panel discussed this event, they displayed a great understanding of union issues and the impact police unions would have on the success or failure on the merger of police departments or services. The panel pinpointed and explained one of the most difficult issues to resolve among so many unions. This was stated best by one of the police chief’s on the panel, “What is important to a member from one department may not be important to a member from a different department. Multiply this by the 400 or so municipal police unions in the state and such resolution or commonality to wants and desires become impossible. The probability of so many police associations coming together is nil.” As this was discussed, the panel found agreement on the idea that a singular police union would be very difficult to form, causing them to issue low scores of probability in each of the categories. In fact, the group only identified an approximate 4% probability of Ev-5 occurring within the next ten years. This low probability of occurrence did not affect the group’s thinking of the impact of such an event if it did occur. The panel termed Ev-5 as one of those events having low probability but high impact. The participants established Ev-5 with having the highest possible impact score (+10). The group believed the coming together of all police officers in the state less than one union umbrella would significantly increase the opportunity to create a merger of police departments or even a single state police agency.

3. Cross Impact Analysis

Table 6 depicts the cross impact analysis of each event on each trend from the professional panel. A discussion of the analysis is provided for the most significant impacts. The analysis includes Ev-1, Ev-2 and Ev-4.

Table 6. Cross Impact Analysis (Professional Panel)

| | Tr-1 | Tr-2 | Tr-3 | Tr-4 | Tr-5 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|
| Ev-1 | +5 | +3 | +4 | +4 | 0 |
| Ev-2 | +4 | 0 | -4 | 0 | 0 |
| Ev-3 | +2 | -1 | +2 | 0 | 0 |
| Ev-4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -5 |
| Ev-5 | -2 | 0 | 0 | -2 | 0 |
| Tr-1: Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs. Tr-2: Liability exposure for law enforcement. Tr-3: Desire to have local control of police. Tr-4: Cost of police personnel. Tr-5: Level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry. Ev-1: A second large terrorist attack on the United States. Ev-2: A catastrophic natural disaster. Ev-3: A catastrophic communication failure between police departments. Ev-4: An open border with Mexico. Ev-5: Police officers forming a statewide union. | | | | | |

a. Analysis of Event 1

The occurrence of a second terrorist attack against the United States (Ev-1) had the greatest impact on the most trends. It is interesting to see that such a horrific, negative event may provide positive or good impact to most trends. For example, resource sharing by cities occurred in New York after the attacks on the World Trade Center. Municipal leaders all over the country shared personnel and equipment (Tr-1) in the rescue and recovery efforts after these terrorist attacks occurred. Such an event galvanized city governments to share resources in order to enhance effectiveness and efficiency, along with the need to demonstrate empathy and patriotism for New Yorkers. This event was rated to have the highest and most positive impact (+5) on any of the trends. The panel felt that a second terrorist attack would increase the chances of thrusting police consolidation into the mainstream, making it an accepted practice to combat terrorism.

A panel discussion of the liability exposure for law enforcement (Tr-2) had an interesting and positive outcome when measured against a second large terrorist attack (Ev-1). The panel theorized a second attack would allow law enforcement even more latitude in the area of search and seizure, as the desire of achieving national security would be embraced by most of America. The panelists believed the public, along with criminal justice system, would tolerate an increase in police powers to an even greater level. While this author does not condone actions that reduce a person's civil liberties, it

would be a grave oversight not to point out the increased public tolerance for police intrusiveness that has occurred in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, in exchange for greater security. It may be that such a phenomenon translates into less liability exposure to law enforcement (Tr-2). Participants stated the occurrence of Ev-1 would only increase the public's tolerance, with inverse impacts to police agencies.

The Professional Panel believed that Ev-1 might have a profound positive effect on the desire to give up local control of police departments (Tr-3). The need to rally personnel resources, specialized expertise, and equipment in the aftermath of a terrorist attack may be the impetus to consolidate smaller police departments. The pressure of providing citizens with proper police services may cause city leaders to change their stance on the issue of local control for the enhanced resources that would occur under a consolidation. The desire to control or have control over one's own police department might evaporate as the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.

A second terrorist attack (Ev-1) has the potential to drive down personnel cost (Tr-4). It may be that such an attack is seen by Generation X and Y as a call to arms to join law enforcement in order to fight terrorism. Much like the Great Generation flooded the armed services to participate in World War II, the nation's youngest generations may see this as an opportunity to make their mark in history. With a flooded police candidate market, the rule of supply and demand would allow police agencies to reduce benefit packages and salary, as the pool of candidates would be increased. This would be possible as a candidate's motivation for joining law enforcement would not come from salary, benefits, or retirement packages, but from something intangible: patriotism.

b. Analysis of Event 2

It was theorized that the occurrence of a catastrophic natural disaster (Ev-2) might have significant positive effects that would increase resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower cost (Tr-1). In a natural disaster setting, local municipalities commonly assist each other to restore order and preserve human life. However, the effect of this event on this trend is a forced relationship as a result of a devastating incident and not seen as initiated for the perpetual good of law enforcement.

Because this was seen as something that communities did not seek out on their own in order to survive, the sharing of such resources was seen as short-term with no lasting effect.

Most citizens view the local police department as belonging to them. It is possible that a desire to give up local control of a police department (Tr-3) would be negatively affected by a catastrophic natural disaster (Ev-2). Such an event would have residents needing and wanting their local police departments more than ever and looking to this agency for leadership. The panel felt citizens would not want to give this control up for the betterment of a regional effort.

c. Analysis of Event 4

According to the panelists, an open border with Mexico (Ev-4) would produce a powerful negative impact on the demands placed on law enforcement with an acute change in demographics (Tr-5). It was theorized that many communities would increase their bi-lingual Mexican population and provide law enforcement officers with an overwhelming burden of language and cultural challenges that are already out of proportion today. With a greater influx of Mexican citizens into the United States, local law enforcement would find itself in a precarious situation as the need for bi-lingual police officers would skyrocket, with recruitment and hiring of local bi-lingual cops unable to keep pace. Without the ability to properly communicate with citizens, daily operations of agencies would erode.

C. LAW ENFORCEMENT PANEL RESULTS

1. Trends

The law enforcement panel identified twenty-five trends. The panel ranked five of these as being the most significant. These five trends are designated Tr-1 through Tr-5 and are summarized in Table 7. A synopsis of the panel discussion for each of the trends is provided below.

Table 7. Trends (Law Enforcement Panel)

| Trend (Tr) | -5 years | Today | +5 years | +10 years | Concern Level (1-10) |
|--|----------|-------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| Tr-1 | 75 | 100 | 125 | 175 | 8 |
| Tr-2 | 50 | 100 | 125 | 250 | 5 |
| Tr-3 | 100 | 100 | 150 | 200 | 5 |
| Tr-4 | 100 | 100 | 150 | 175 | 10 |
| Tr-5 | 75 | 100 | 150 | 175 | 9 |
| Tr-1= Number of differing benefit packages among police departments. Tr-2= Number of oversight bodies governing police departments. Tr-3= Community expectations of police department services. Tr-4= Desire for politicians to have local control of police. Tr-5= The number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments. | | | | | |

The first trend (Tr-1) identified by the panel was the “number of differing benefit packages among police departments.” Most members of the panel believed that police officer benefits and salary packages were more closely matched from city to city five years ago, reflecting a score of 75, below the baseline of 100. The panel believed this trend would continue to increase, reaching 125 in five years and 175 in ten years, indicating police benefits becoming more diverse in the future. They explained that each police department appeared to have its own set of benefits and mechanisms to calculate fair salaries based upon the needs of the organization, resulting in an inconsistent set of salary levels and benefits within the police profession. Two members of the panel projected that police benefits would be more homogenous in the future. These panelists said the police industry is “coming together” through the sharing of contract strategies and collaborative surveys to gain equality in pay and benefits. While the panel was split as to the direction of the trend, they agreed that combining police agencies would create the need to equalize salary and benefits for all those involved. The panel forecasted that attempting to gain consensus from the police unions involved in a merger would be an impediment to merging. It was the panel’s belief that police associations had the power to negatively impact or effectively nullify the formation of a merger via the negotiation process for salaries and benefits. Thus, the level of concern was rated very high, with the average score established at 8.

The second trend (Tr-2) identified by the panel was the “number of oversight bodies governing police departments.” The panel viewed this trend as increasing. It was scored as a 50 five years ago, just half of the established baseline (100), and moving upward to 150 in five years and 250 in ten years. The panel said that community policing

increased oversight of police departments by establishing citizen review boards and other community-based collaborations some ten years ago. However, they identified Tr-2 to be increasing commensurate with the increasing in regional police initiatives they perceived. The panel reasoned the increased number of multi-agency task forces created over the past several years had increased the number of unique oversight bodies for these ventures. They recognized that such task forces have controlling bodies that are outside the norm. One of the members identified a narcotics task force that was governed by the county's police chief association, without official oversight from the parent agencies of the involved personnel. Another member of the group participated in a local helicopter consortium made up of seven police departments. This specialized air support unit was controlled by a board of directors (each city's chief of police) and board of governors (each city's manager). The panel believed these types of regionalized groups would continue to have non-traditional oversight, increasing Tr-2 over time. The participants viewed the level of concern for this trend to be moderate (5), as they did not believe this trend to have more than an average impact on the consolidation of police departments or service mergers.

The third trend (Tr-3) that was identified by the panel was "community expectations of police department services." Each of the panel members, with the exception of one, said they believed expectations from community members would continue to increase as it relates to police services. Most of the panelists told anecdotal stories of the changes they have seen in law enforcement regarding new programs, special projects, community initiatives and other increased services over the course of their careers. On average, the panel's scores revealed a belief that community service expectations would increase from a baseline of 100, to 150 in five years and 200 in ten years. It was the consensus of the panel that police departments would continue to add innovative services to meet these expectations. The panel rationalized that a police department that continually increased its services to meet the needs of its citizenry would increase the bonds it had with its community, making it more difficult for citizens and politicians to fathom altering its police department's structure. However, one panel member reminded the group that many police departments would not be able to meet the increased service demands of the future, creating a need to collaborate with other police

departments to increase capabilities. After this discussion, the panel was split on the level of concern, resulting in a moderate score (5).

The fourth trend (Tr-4) identified by the panel was “the desire for politicians to have local control of their police department.” The panelist agreed that city councils have always desired control over local police departments. The group viewed this trend to be the same five years ago when compared to the baseline of today (100). The participants were unanimous in their belief that the desire for local control would increase over time, thus, the group rated this trend to be increasing to 150 in five years and 175 in ten years. The panel agreed this trend would hamper the consolidation of police departments as a mainstream solution to fighting terrorism. This trend garnered the highest concern level possible (10).

The fifth trend (Tr-5) identified by the panel was the “number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments.” During the discussion of Tr-2, this topic was discussed as it relates to police oversight. Two of the panel members had experience with these types of task forces, having been assigned to them for several years each. Thus, the group allowed these two individuals to tell of their experiences. These panel members took turns explaining the strengths and weaknesses of each task force. For the most part, the comments were positive. However, each agreed the crucial element for a successful multi-agency group was the operational leadership involved, along with proper support from the parent agency. After hearing from these two panelists, the participants viewed a rapid increase in this trend, doubling (200) in five years and tripling (300) in ten years. The panel explained that success in such task forces would lead to more, paving the way for the idea of merging police departments or services to fight terrorism. This trend received the second highest level of concern (9).

2. Events

The law enforcement panel identified twenty-five events they felt would change the future and possibly lead to the development of consolidated police departments or increased service mergers. The panel ranked five of these as being the most significant. These five events are designated Ev-1 through Ev-5 and are summarized in Table 8. A synopsis of the panel discussion surrounding each event is provided after the table.

Table 8. Events (Law Enforcement Panel)

| Event (Ev) | Year(s) > 0 | +5 years | +10 years | Impact -10 to +10 |
|--|-------------|----------|-----------|-------------------|
| Ev-1 | 1 | 19% | 26% | +7 |
| Ev-2 | 1 | 65% | 62% | +8 |
| Ev-3 | 3 | 26% | 39% | +5 |
| Ev-4 | 9 | 0% | 10% | -1 |
| Ev-5 | 1 | 75% | 100% | -9 |
| Ev-1=Second great depression. Ev-2=Bio-terrorism attack on the United States. Ev-3=Military attack on the United States. Ev-4=Legalization of all narcotics. Ev-5=Major police corruption scandal. | | | | |

The panel defined a second great depression (Ev-1) as an economic event capable of setting off a collapse of the country's financial markets, resulting in a worldwide economic depression or severe recession. The participants believed this event would be possible within one year, increasing to a 19% probability in five years and 26% probability in ten years. The panel was unanimous as it viewed Ev-1 as having a high impact (+7) on the formation of consolidated police departments or law enforcement services. As one of the members of the group stated, "If such an event happened, cities would have no recourse but to search for the most economic way to put cops on the street. Combining police forces would be inevitable under these circumstances." The negative socioeconomic impact of Ev-1 would turn into a positive catalyst, possibly initiating the merging police departments.

The second event (Ev-2) was described as a major bio-terrorism attack on the United States. The panel explained this event to be the release of a biological element in a highly populated urban area, resulting in thousands of casualties. The group believed this event to be possible within one year and described its probability of occurrence to be 65% in five years, but decreasing to 62% in ten years. The panel stated that technology, increased security measures, and the investment of greater intelligence collection would decrease the probability of occurrence over time. During the discussion, two panel members explained how this event would negatively impact the idea of merging police organizations. They said the event would create an extended time period of chaos, requiring police officers to be on the street a greater number of hours, even in cities where the attack did not occur. They argued that this would reinforce the idea of local control to city leaders who would want to keep police resources "home," instead of honoring the agreed-upon mutual aid requirements. In fact, one of the panelists theorized

that some politicians may want the local police department to void mutual aid pacts as a method to make sure police resources remain under local control. The other four panel members disagreed with this point of view. They stated Ev-2 would kill many local first responders from a number of municipalities, creating a public safety void. The group believed impacted communities would band together through some sort of formal agreement to merge police forces on a limited basis and for a set time period. These panel members argued that this would positively impact the creation of merged police services. After the discussion ended, the group unanimously voted for Ev-2 to be a positive occurrence in relation to the issue being studied, rating the second highest impact score (+8) in relation to the other events.

The third event (Ev-3) identified by the panel was some sort of military attack on the United States. The participants described this as a non-terrorist attack in nature, stating the enemy would be another country, possibly an emerging superpower. Each of the panel members viewed this event as having an increasing level of probability with the first year of occurrence in three years. The panelists viewed the probability to be 26% in five years and 39% in ten years. Two of the panelists with military experience rated the ten-year probability much higher than the established average. These panel members believed the war in Afghanistan and Iraqi had reduced military resources, leaving the United States vulnerable to attack from another nation. They forecasted this would be a war of natural resources, as water, oil, and other necessities are becoming scarce. Even though the panel was split on the timeline and probabilities, they unanimously believed it would be a moderate (+5) positive impact on the ideas of consolidation police agencies.

The majority of the panel believed the outbreak of war would unite communities and increase the desire and need to share resources on an unprecedented level. Such sharing would create a climate conducive to eventually merging police departments. The panel did not view this type of event as causing a great impact to the issue being discussed, as it did for Ev-2. The panel discussed this and rationalized that the attack on the United States would be entirely handled by the military, while Ev-2 would be a local incident, for locals to solve.

The fourth event (Ev-4) identified by the panel was the legalization of narcotics. Ev-4 was described to be a sweeping legislative event, allowing for all drugs to be legalized. While one panel member did not believe this event could be linked to the matter being studied, another panelist linked E-4 as it relates to funding the war on terrorism. This panelist said the war on terrorism would become so costly Americans would demand an end to the war on drugs, allowing the federal government to regulate and tax these newly legalized products to finance fighting terrorism. After this discussion the participants identified the first possibility of occurrence to be in nine years, making the probability 0% in five years. The panel believed the probability would increase to 10% in ten years. This event was rated as having a slight negative impact (-1) on the issue being reviewed, as legalizing all narcotics would eliminate the need for police departments to coordinate the many drug task forces that currently exist. This would reduce multi-jurisdictional collaboration, and thus reduce the “stepping stones” to consolidation.

The fifth event (Ev-5) identified by the panel was a major police corruption scandal. The panelists defined this event to be a criminal incident, identifying police officers as suspects from a large metropolitan police department. The panel identified the first possibility of occurrence to be in one year, with an 81% probability of occurrence in five years and a 90% probability of occurrence in ten years. Most of the panel believed the event would have a negative impact on the issue being studied. The majority explained that Ev-5 had the potential of influencing the opinion of citizens and politicians that a large police department would be difficult to manage and hold accountable, exposing city leaders to greater liability. Thus, combining smaller police agencies to form one larger police department in order to fight terrorism would not be an appealing model to follow. The panel impact rating for this event was the highest (-9).

3. Cross Impact Analysis

Table 9 depicts the cross impact analysis of each event on each trend from the law enforcement panel. A narrative analysis of the panel’s discussion is provided for the most significant events. The analysis includes Ev-1 and Ev-5.

Table 9. Cross Impact Analysis (Law Enforcement Panel)

| | Tr-1 | Tr-2 | Tr-3 | Tr-4 | Tr-5 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|
| Ev-1 | +7 | 0 | +7 | +7 | -5 |
| Ev-2 | 0 | 0 | -3 | -3 | 0 |
| Ev-3 | 0 | 0 | +3 | +1 | 0 |
| Ev-4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ev-5 | -1 | -5 | -7 | -8 | -2 |
| <p>Tr-1= Number of differing benefit packages among police departments. Tr-2= The number of community oversight bodies governing police departments. Tr-3= Community expectations of police department services. Tr-4= Desire for politicians to have local control of police. Tr-5= The number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments. Ev-1=Second great depression. Ev-2=Bio-terrorism attack on the United States. Ev-3=Military attack on the United States. Ev-4=Legalization of all narcotics. Ev-5=Major police corruption scandal.</p> | | | | | |

a. Analysis of Event 1

The panel believed the occurrence of a second great depression (Ev-1) would cause an immediate decrease in municipal tax revenues, reducing the number of varied benefit packages among police departments (Tr-1). An economic collapse would hamper or completely eliminate a city's ability to pay for its police department. Under these circumstances, some cities would seek partners to share law enforcement costs. The panel forecasted that Ev-1 would have a positive impact on slowing or completely reversing the trend of increasing benefit packages among police departments (Tr-1). The group theorized that cities would find themselves in a strong bargaining position to revise police contracts, reducing salary and benefits into simple terms, creating a more homogenous benefit package in the law enforcement profession. The panel of participants believed it would be fundamentally easier to create a police merger with salary and benefit offerings similar rather than varied. For this reason, the panel scored the impact of Ev-1 on Tr-1 very high (+7).

As cities attempted to reduce police costs at a result of Ev-1, the panel believed the community's expectations for police services (Tr-3) would decline. The panel explained that citizens and political leaders alike would be cognizant of the economic challenges facing the city, lowering their service expectations. The panel discussed the reluctance of most communities to create new taxes to fund or maintain city services. The panels discussed the numerous ballot measures that have been defeated over the past ten years in local and state elections that attempted to tax citizens more in

order to pay for normal services provided by local governments. The panel was unanimous that Ev-1 would have a “good” or positive impact on the creation of consolidated police departments or merged police services and issued it a high score (+7) as it related to Tr-3.

In the face of an economic depression (Ev-1), panel participants believed politicians would have a reduced desire to maintain control of the local police department (Tr-4). The panel discussed local control and believed joining forces with another police agency would be a way to retain some sort of control during tough economic times, as the alternative would be to contract with the county sheriff’s department, transferring control to county politicians. The discussion regarding local control concluded with the panel unanimously theorizing politicians wanted to control police departments, not citizens. The panel stated that citizens were interested in the most effective and efficient means to have the best possible police force, while politicians were looking for a means to garner votes for the next election. The panel believed politicians sought to use police agencies to further their own political ambitions. The panel scored Ev-1 to have a high impact on Tr-4 (+7).

Last, the panel considered the impact of a great economic depression (Ev-1) on the number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments (Tr-5). Most of the panel members believed municipal police departments would remove their personnel from these work groups as such an economic event would most likely force cities to lay off police officers in order to reduce costs, forcing personnel assigned to task forces to return to their parent agency to fill assignment gaps. With a decrease in the number of multi-jurisdictional teams, cooperation and collaborative efforts between cities would be reduced. The panel identified this as having a negative impact on the effort to initiate consolidated police agencies or merge police services. This impact was reflected with a negative score (-5).

b. Analysis of Event 5

The panel of participants believed a major police corruption scandal (Ev-5) would increase the number of community oversight bodies governing police departments (Tr-2). Two panel members took turns talking about the changes that took place in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) after the beating of Rodney King.

They surmised the excessive force scandal created the demand by Los Angeles politicians and citizens for greater oversight of the police. The participants explained how increased review boards were formed, along with more community involvement and increased powers to the Los Angeles Police Commission. From this example, the panel determined that Ev-5 would increase Tr-2 and create an atmosphere of distrust between politicians/citizens and police. This would translate into a greater desire for increased review of the local police, not decreasing the chances of acceptance for small police departments to be turned into large police departments through consolidation. The panel scored the affect of Ev-5 on Tr-2 to be negative (-5), restricting the notion police consolidation.

When the panelists discussed the impact of Ev-5 on Tr-3 (citizen expectations of police services), they concluded that these expectations would decrease in the face of a major police corruption scandal as citizens would begin to question or lose confidence in their local police force. The panel perceived all police departments to be impacted by such a large scandal, as the public would identify all police officers as possibly being corrupt. As this occurred, the panel decided that citizens would not want to have a police force that was larger and seemingly less likely to be accountable for their actions. The panel believed the affect of Ev-5 on Tr-3 would result in a “bad” or negative impact on the restructuring of police services into some sort of consolidated model. This belief was represented with a score of -7.

Last, the participants considered the effect of Ev-5 on Tr-4 (the desire for politicians to have local control of police). When this impact was discussed, the panel talked about the LAPD Rampart scandal as they considered it very close to depicting Ev-5. The panel identified some of the issues that were revealed within this LAPD investigation. One of the panelists recalled a debriefing he attended given by then-Police Chief Bernard Parks. This panel member told the group that one of the major issues in the Rampart investigation was a lack of supervision and accountability within the Rampart Division. The entire panel discussed this issue and decided local politicians would want to clamp down on their police departments to make sure such a scandal did not occur “on their watch.” The panel believed Ev-5 would increase a politician’s desire

for local control of police, thereby reducing the likelihood of increasing the size of agencies through consolidation. The group of panelists provided a high negative score of Ev-5's effect on Tr-4 (-8).

D. AREAS OF CONGRUENCE BETWEEN PANELS

It is important to identify the areas of congruence between the professional and law enforcement panels. These areas signify important issues, positive or negative, relating to the consolidation of police agencies or merging of police services. As the groups involved were diverse in background and each member incorporated dissimilar perspectives, congruent issues between the panels were considered the most significant to the thesis research. With the assumption that diverse panels would identify different problems and construct varied solutions to an issue, the intersected ideas and issues of these two panels were deemed to be valid and relevant. Thus, the areas of congruence were considered as the most critical pieces of information.

For each panel, a complete list of trends and events has been constructed in a side-by-side configuration in order to easily compare and contrast their similarities and dissimilarities. They have been color-coded for easy identification. Trends and/or events from one panel that match those of another panel have the same color markings. Overall, there are four areas of similarity between the panels. Table 10 summarizes the findings.

Table 10. Congruence of Panels

| Trends (Tr) Professional Panel | Trends (Tr) Law Enforcement Panel | Events (Ev) Professional Panel | Events (Ev) Law Enforcement Panel |
|--|--|--|--|
| Tr-1: Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs. | Tr-1: The number of differing benefit packages among police departments. | Ev-1: A second large terrorist attack on the United States. | Ev-1: A Second great depression. |
| Tr-2: Liability exposure for law enforcement. | Tr-2: The number of community oversight bodies governing police departments. | Ev-2: A catastrophic natural disaster. | Ev-2: A Bio-terrorism attack on the United States. |
| Tr-3: The desire to have local control of police. | Tr-3: Community expectations of police department services. | Ev-3: A catastrophic communication failure between police departments. | Ev-3: A Military attack on the United States. |
| Tr-4: The cost of police personnel. | Tr-4: The desire for politicians to have local | Ev-4: An open border with Mexico. | Ev-4: The legalization of all narcotics. |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | control of police. | | |
| Tr-5: The level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry. | Tr-5: The number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments. | Ev-5: Police officers forming a statewide union. | Ev-5: A major police corruption scandal. |

Between the two panels, three of five, or 60% of the trends were similar. The professional panel's Tr-1 matched the law enforcement panel's Tr-5. These two trends identified increased resource sharing and the formation of multi-agency police teams among local cops. The analysis of these trends was the same by each panel. They projected the trends to have a positive or "good" impact in the development of consolidated police departments or services in the future. The professional panel's Tr-3 matched the law enforcement panel's Tr-4, as both considered the issue of local control. However, the professional group clearly identified the impetus for local control to be citizens and the law enforcement group stated the push would be from politicians. The groups were united, however, in the belief that local control would be the most challenging issue facing police consolidation and the most difficult to overcome. Last, the professional panel's Tr-5 was closely related to the law enforcement panel's Tr-3. Each of these trends dealt with police service demands or expectations. The groups agreed that these trends had both positive and negative connotations to police consolidation.

When considering events, the similarities between panels totaled only one of five, or 20%. The professional panel's Ev-1 was the single match to Ev-2 from the law enforcement panel. However, the panels produced different results from these events. The professional panel's Ev-1 had a high, positive impact on the group's trends and aided in the formation of a new police model, while the law enforcement panel's Ev-2 had little or no impact on the group's trends and was insignificant to forming a consolidated police agency. The different findings on the same event may be attributed to the cross impact analysis, as the trends for each were dissimilar, producing alternate outcomes. Also, as this analysis is based upon the group's perspective differences were anticipated.

At the end of the panel discussions, each of the members was asked if a consolidated police force would be an effective way to approach the future of policing in order to provide greater protection from terrorism. The members of each panel,

professional and law enforcement, agreed that such a police model would be effective, but not politically practical. Their views diverged when explaining how consolidation may occur.

The professional panel believed that it would take a great deal of time and influence to make consolidating police departments a mainstream solution to fighting terrorism. This panel discussed the possibilities of a large police consolidation and the specific types of positive impact such a police model would bring to Los Angeles County and its capabilities relating to counter-terrorism. The panel predicted a slow migration toward this type of police model. They believed resource sharing would increase over time, along with the formation of more and more regional teams that achieved successful results. The panel stated the ultimate requirement would be political sponsorship and the need to save money.

The law enforcement panel discussed the impact of citizen groups and the pressure applied to local politicians, as they described how a merger of police departments or the consolidation of services would occur in the future. These panel members agreed with the professional panel as to the many benefits this new police model would generate in Los Angeles County, stretching counter-terrorism capabilities across a broader populous, ultimately benefiting more people. However, they were not optimistic that politicians would quietly remove themselves from controlling their police agencies. The law enforcement panel believed consolidation would occur as a matter of economic need and be spurred by citizens unwilling to pay more taxes to support the local law enforcement entity.

E. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE OUTCOMES

Ultimately, the NGT exercise was used to identify issues and/or challenges relating to the subject being studied in order to assist in the identification of solutions. Scenarios were constructed from the NGT in order to provide greater clarity to the possible futures that these events and trends may create. From a basic scenario, three outcomes have been depicted to focus the subject matter. The three outcomes create futures that are normative, pessimistic, and optimistic. Each of the outcomes is derived

from the same initial scenario. The process of scenario development has been utilized in the past and deemed valuable when attempting to devise homeland security strategies.⁶⁹

1. Scenario Background

The cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena are nestled against the foothills in northern Los Angeles County. They are situated in linear fashion, each with a portion of its boundary adjacent to the city of Los Angeles. The cities span seventy-two square miles, with a combined population of approximately 500,000.

It is the fourteenth anniversary of the most devastating terrorist attacks in United States history. The assault killed thousands of innocent victims and ended the safety and security that Americans took for granted, changing the world forever. As the twin towers collapsed and the Pentagon proved vulnerable, this altered world was symbolized by the passengers of United Airlines Flight 93 who battled hijackers and purposely downed their airliner in a Pennsylvania field to avoid additional devastation on the ground.

During the years following the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States went to war, destroying the Taliban government in Afghanistan, along with terrorist camps in the Philippines and Korea. President George W. Bush took exhaustive measures to topple Saddam Hussein's government, ending with this tyrant's execution. With an American military base established near Baghdad, a United States-led coalition invaded Iran with an overwhelming military force, reducing Iranian nuclear facilities to rubble. For over a decade, the United States government used preemptive military strikes against terrorists living in foreign countries, while increasing security measures in the homeland. The government unraveled a number of threats and plots that included an assortment of attacks that promised death and destruction to all Americans.

The American public grew weary of terrorism, taxes, and the security "enhancements" that inconvenienced even a trip to the grocery store. As a result, most longed for the days of a bustling economy, and an end to the daily terror warnings from the Department of Homeland Security. With no other terrorist attacks occurring on American soil, the public became desensitized to the possibility of another occurrence.

⁶⁹ Gilmore Commission Report, *Forging America's New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland Preserving Our Security*, Vol. V (Arlington: RAND, December 15, 2003), 11-21.

This sentiment influenced local police departments to reduce or eliminate their focus on terrorism, causing deterioration to overall counter-terrorism capabilities to a pre-9/11 disposition.

2. Scenario

It is September 11, 2015. It is a hot, muggy day in the Los Angeles basin. At 7:00 a.m., the city-bound commuters on the Interstate 10 and 5 freeways are using their air conditioners to soothe the sun's pounding rays. Already, it is eighty-five degrees with thermometers expected to reach triple digits by the lunch hour. Traffic is snarled and the occupants of each car tune to their favorite radio station, listening to the latest news. A large yellow Ryder rental truck eases off the freeway and maneuvers through the downtown area of Burbank. The truck parks in front of an elementary school where 700 students will soon gather as they prepare to enter classrooms to begin the day. Two young men wait inside the cab of the truck nervous that they will be detected; each looks from side to side in an effort to locate any passersby. The men are somber, serious, and dedicated to their mission. They have waited patiently for nearly fifteen years, planning with precision and willing to die for the cause.

In the cities of Glendale and Pasadena, the same plot is unfolding. Young men working in pairs, driving large trucks containing tons of explosives are positioning themselves in public areas where children are present. In Pasadena, one of the men reflects on the strategy to attack targets in these small communities. He recalls being told by fellow believers that local police are incapable of stopping them and the killing of American children is necessary to support the war against the infidels. He is certain the plan will be a success.

a. Normative Outcome

At 7:35 a.m., all of the trucks are in place. With great precision, cellular telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams. The orders are given to detonate after assuring each team leader God is pleased with their mission. Trucks explode in Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena, tearing through adjacent buildings and killing most of the occupants. In total, these attacks kill over 1,500 Americans in three cities. As the victims are identified, it is found that nearly all are under the age of fifteen.

During the initial hours, and extending to many days and weeks following this multi-city terrorist attack, affected municipalities call upon mutual aid agreements to share police services in an extensive fashion. The response and cooperativeness of the involved cities are both courageous and generous, but uncoordinated and slow. Cities lack the ability to communicate with each other as radio systems are dissimilar and fragmented.

While law enforcement responds to the disaster, resources are lacking in relationship to the need. Regular patrol officers and detective personnel are pooled together to perform their respective duties. Mutual aid officers are used to provide the basic law enforcement functions, as the local officers are needed for rescue and recovery efforts. Detective personnel are utilized to provide follow up investigations to ensure those cases that concerned threats of public safety are adequately brought to completion, while all other cases are filed for completion at a later date. Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT) are consolidated and used as regional response teams as fears of additional attacks are reported to be imminent. Police officers with canines are reduced in number and sent to locations that require more rescue personnel. The remaining canine teams are consolidated in order to cover requests that involve the use of police dogs throughout the impacted tri-city area. Helicopter patrols are merged together, flying singular patrols for all three cities, providing greater police presence and a possible deterrent to further attacks.

The city councils of the three besieged cities release local control of their police departments for the time being and allow a complete sharing of resources to cope with the disaster at hand. The politicians view this occurrence as an attack on the United States, and not an attack on the individual cities. Thus, the leadership is united to fight against a mutual enemy and trust one another to share each other's resources. Territorial boundaries and any local squabbles that exist are wiped out in the name of patriotism.

Within six months of this terrible disaster, each municipality returns its resources and begins assessing the hometown's need. Cooperation among the three cities and those throughout the valley exists, but the ad-hoc configuration of police services that was put into place to respond to the disaster dissolves, returning to business as usual.

b. Pessimistic Outcome

At 7:35 a.m., all of the trucks are in place. With great precision, cellular telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams. The orders are given to detonate after assuring each team leader God is pleased with their mission. Trucks explode in Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena, tearing through adjacent buildings and killing most of the occupants. In total, these attacks kill over 2,500 Americans in three cities. As the victims are identified, it is found that nearly all are under the age of fifteen.

Each of the cities is in chaos. There are not enough police resources to properly respond to such an incident and mutual aid agreements are not in place. Nearly eight years ago, the desire for local control of police departments from community members and powerful politicians caused area police chiefs to withdraw from any agreement that did not allow direct control of police resources to come from within their own departments. With this structure, any type of effective mutual response to such a terrorist attack was found to be impossible. As a result, it is estimated that an additional 1,000 lives were lost when emergency personnel responded and lacked proper training, equipment, communications, and the ability to call upon neighboring municipalities for assistance.

In the weeks, months, and years that followed this horrific event, criticism of law enforcement's response to this attack was fast and furious. Community leaders spoke out against the police department's leadership and each of the police departments was blamed for the loss of life that many considered a result of the slow and inadequate response to each of the scenes, along with the failure to possess a vision of the future and need to possess cooperative agreements with other cities. Many of the police officers in each of the agencies experienced a loss of morale and along with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A high number of officers retired from law enforcement due to psychological problems associated with the terrorist attack while others opted to "lateral" to other police agencies outside of the three cities.

Like a group of dominoes falling, the exiting police personnel created historically high rates of vacancies. Most of the three police departments attempted to

recruit new hires with bonuses, better retirement, lifetime medical, and other costly incentives that doubled expenditures for personnel when compared to the benefit packages before the attacks on the cities. The gap between increasing personnel costs and decreasing opportunities for each of the cities to generate revenue in the era of terrorism was continuing to expand with no easy solution identified.

c. Optimistic Outcome

At 7:35 a.m., all of the trucks are in place. With great precision, cellular telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams. The orders are given to detonate after assuring each team leader that God is pleased with their mission. Each of the teams' attempts to detonate their bombs, but nothing happens.

Meanwhile, the Anti-Terrorist Section (ATS) of the Tri-Cities Police Authority has three surveillance units in place to watch each of the terrorists' trucks carefully, while members of SWAT are deployed at each of the locations in case an immediate assault is necessary. The ATS command intercepts and listens to the incoming cellular telephone calls that order the terrorists to carry out their plans. As the orders come to the terrorists telephonically, the ATS leadership instructs the SWAT officers to arrest the occupants of the trucks. The tactical teams swarm the trucks, removing the terrorists and placing them under arrest.

The ATS infiltrated the terrorist cell nearly two years ago, managing to identify the locations where their explosives would be purchased. The ATS arranged for each of the sales to the terrorists to be non-explosive material that would cause no public safety hazard. The public and the police officers making the arrest were never in danger.

The Tri-Cities Police Authority was formed in 2006 after the terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center and several successful regional programs proved the idea of police consolidation worthy of a try. Within this small suburban area, the police departments of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena created a regional atmosphere of sharing resources by introducing new programs in small increments. Beginning in 1998, the police departments funded helicopter patrols of all their cities; set up a single SWAT team; and a three-city canine unit. All of these programs allowed a significant number of

personnel resources to transfer from their old assignments to other areas that required more personnel, including seven police officers, one sergeant and one lieutenant to a tri-city Anti Terrorist Section.

With great success in these regional programs, the three police departments began theorizing a merger. With two of the three police chiefs available for retirement in 2003, a plan was put forward to study the issue of consolidation and make recommendations. In 2006, a plan was initiated and the Tri-Cities Police Authority was born. This new department was under the leadership of one police chief and a police Board of Governors that represented each of the cities equally. Additionally, a citizen review commission was formed to ensure each of the three communities was represented, providing input to police programs, policies, and other important issues.

While this material is subjective and not scientific, it lends clarity to many of the issues possibly facing law enforcement in the years to come. Because both panels identified the issue of local control to be the most daunting to the creation of a more centralized police model, it seems appropriate to provide greater insight into this issue. Therefore, the next chapter is dedicated to the issues surrounding local control and analyzing this important aspect of the research being conducted.

IV. LOCAL CONTROL

A. INTRODUCTION

The ability of residents and elected officials to incorporate values into the local policing approach in resolving local community problems was embedded into American government by the signers of the constitution.⁷⁰ The American political idea has always been to restrict, as far as possible, the power of the government.⁷¹ This is underscored in the constitutional axioms that created the separation of church and state, checks and balances, and states' rights. It is with these restrictions the American public binds those who are trusted with power, holding them accountable for their actions. While local control theoretically establishes greater accountability, making government employees and politicians directly answerable to their communities,⁷² there appears to be an assumption that a municipality's residents and local politicians are inflexible on the issue, viewing it as an absolute requirement for the structuring of a responsible police department.

The greatest impediment to police consolidation or the merging of police services is the perceptual or actual reduction of local control by citizens and politicians over their police department. For neighborhood residents and elected officials, police consolidation creates the fear that services will be reduced, responsiveness will be decreased, and their ability to direct local police resources will be undermined. This issue received great attention in much of the literature concerning police department mergers and/or service consolidations. Additionally, the NGT process confirmed what the literature asserted as both interview panels identified an increasing desire for citizens and politicians to have ultimate control over local police resources. With local control as the most probable

⁷⁰ O. Elmer Polk and David W. MacKenna, "Dilemmas of the New Millennium: Policing in the 21st Century," *Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences*, Vol. XXX, Issue 3 (September/October 2005): 1-6.

⁷¹ Charles Edwards, "Democratic Control of Police: How 19th Century Political Systems Determine Modern Policing Structures." History of Crime, Policing, and Punishment Conference, Canberra, Australia, (December 9-10, 1999) available at <http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/hcpp/edwards.pdf>, accessed on August 5, 2005.

⁷² Ibid.

obstacle to the implementation of merging police departments to fight terrorism, the subject requires and deserves further scrutiny.

B. THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT

In 1972, the Kansas City Police Department initiated a study to analyze routine preventive patrol and its impact on crime and the community. This landmark study was conducted for twelve consecutive months, ending in October of 1973. During the experiment, routine preventive patrols in fifteen police beats were varied. For beats one through five, preventive patrol was eliminated, and police officers were directed to merely react to calls for service, disallowing proactive action by the assigned personnel. In beats six through ten, routine patrol procedures were maintained, allowing police officers to respond to calls for service and take preventive action as desired. These beats were used as the control measurement for the experiment. For the last five beats, eleven through fifteen, preventive patrols were intensified by two or three times the norm.⁷³ The experiment asked the following questions:

- Would citizens notice changes in the level of police patrol?
- Would different levels of visible police patrol affect recorded crime or the outcome of victim surveys?
- Would citizen fear of crime and attendant behavior change as a result of differing patrol levels?
- Would citizen degree of satisfaction with police change?⁷⁴
- The findings from this experiment provided credible data that concluded the following:
 - Citizens did not notice the difference when the level of patrol was changed or services were altered.
 - The increases and decreases in the level of patrol had no significant effect on specific crimes.
 - The rate at which crimes were reported did not differ across the fifteen beats.
 - Citizen fear of crime was unchanged.
 - Citizen satisfaction with police services was without noticeable difference among the different beats.⁷⁵

⁷³ George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman and Charles E. Brown, "The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report," (Washington D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974), 7.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 16-34.

While the Kansas City study does not negate the issue of local control, it causes considerable doubt that citizens would notice the changes that would occur in the operational levels of its police department in the areas of service delivery, patrol deployment, and response times under a police consolidation or police services merger. The study indicates that a citizen's fear of crime and feeling of safety will not be altered if police services are reconfigured. The experiment suggests that local control of police departments may not be as necessary as critics of police consolidation claim. If local control is tantamount to citizens and politicians, how come they were unable to detect a change in the services received over the course of twelve months? Perhaps the perception of control is more important than actual control. If this supposition is true, merging police agencies or services in order to fight terrorism may be an acceptable mainstream idea that deserves serious consideration and public discussion.

C. CITIZEN SURVEYS AFTER CONSOLIDATION

To date, there have been no police consolidations that were reversed once put into place.⁷⁶ This is not evidence of police mergers being more efficient or effective in the war on terrorism, but it does emphasize the degree to which local citizens and elected officials have accepted or been pleased with benefits derived from altering the structure of policing, diminishing the theory that citizens and politicians would demand complete and ultimate control of police. For communities who have either combined police departments or merged their police services, the evidence of success or acceptance of a new police model may be found in the level of citizen satisfaction.

For the city-county consolidations of Miami-Dade, Nashville-Davidson, Jacksonville-Duval, Indianapolis-Marion, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Lexington-Fayette, and Louisville-Jefferson, there is evidence that citizens continue to endorse the structure of merged government, including police services. Table 11 summarizes these mergers and the level of citizen support that exists for them.

⁷⁵ Kelling et al., "Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment," 7.

⁷⁶ San Francisco Grand Jury Report, "Sheriff/Police Department Merger," (1999-2000) available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3753, accessed on August 2, 2005.

Table 11. Citizen Satisfaction Surveys⁷⁷

| Police Agency | Year Merged | Population (2000) | Citizen Approval Rating before Merger | Citizen Approval Rating after Merger |
|----------------------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| Miami-Dade (FL) | 1957 | 2,253,362 | No vote | Popular |
| Nashville-Davidson (TE) | 1962 | 569,891 | 57% | 72% |
| Jacksonville-Duval (FL) | 1967 | 778,879 | 64% | 68% (10-yr. resident) 83% (new resident) |
| Indianapolis-Marion (IN) | 1969 | 860,454 | No vote | Not popular |
| Charlotte-Mecklenburg (SC) | 1971 | 700,000 | No vote | Popular |
| Lexington-Fayette (KY) | 1972 | 260,512 | 67% | No survey |
| Louisville-Jefferson (KY) | 2003 | 693,604 | 54% | No survey |

There was no initial vote taken to approve the merging of services between the city of Miami and county of Dade (Florida) in 1957. Thus, there is no measurement level of citizen approval at onset of this consolidation. However, in a study assessing the merged city and county twenty years later, citizens identified the consolidated government and the services received as “popular.”⁷⁸ When the City of Nashville and Davidson County (Tennessee) merged, 57% of the voters approved the action. Ten years later, in 1977, a poll revealed that the consolidation increased in popularity to 72%.⁷⁹ Similarly, the union between the City of Jacksonville and Duval County (Florida) increased in citizen popularity over time. This consolidation received 64% backing at the polls when it was initiated, and 68% support in a survey conducted ten years later. For residents living in this area less than ten-years, the percentage jumped to an 83% approval rating.⁸⁰ The consolidation between the City of Indianapolis and Marion County (Indiana) was not taken to the ballot when it was conceived. However, in a survey conducted in 1993, the majority of citizens surveyed were “dissatisfied” with the services provided from the merged governments.⁸¹ In the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County (South Carolina) no vote was taken by citizens, as these two entities

⁷⁷ Sammis White, “Cooperation not Consolidation: The Answer for Milwaukee Governance,” Wisconsin Policy Research Institute Report, vol. 15, no. 8 (November 2002): 5-13.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 12.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 6.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁸¹ Ibid., 9.

did not consolidate organizations, but merged services through a number of contracts. According to internal polls initiated by city officials, the joint service agreements are “popular” with citizens.⁸² For the City of Lexington and Fayette County, 67% of voters approved the merger when it was forged. Since this city-county merger, there have not been any surveys to measure citizen support.⁸³ The City of Louisville and Jefferson County were merged in 2003 with 57% voter approval.⁸⁴ This merger is relatively new and no post-consolidation surveys have been completed.

The survey results and/or initial level of support from voters in favor of consolidation demonstrate a high level of citizen acceptance over a broad based population from different regions of the country. While these surveys do not disprove the desire, need, or a community’s right to have local control of police, the surveys provide evidence that merged police departments or consolidated services may be created with a reduced level of local control that is acceptable to a large majority of citizens. For police leaders and local politicians to reject the idea of consolidating police on the assumption their constituency will not want, or accept consolidation is contrary to the findings of the surveys summarized in Table 11. An example of such an assumption was documented in the professional panel’s NGT process summarized in Chapter III, as one of the participants (a local elected official) stated constituents would never allow politicians to consolidate police departments. He reasoned citizens would not want control of the police department to be given to a broader group of decision makers. This local official was positive his supporters would not want a merged police force. However, he admitted he was making a presumption without really knowing.

D. CREATING LOCAL CONTROL IN A CONSOLIDATED STRUCTURE

As the IACP describes police consolidation as a matter of degree,⁸⁵ perhaps local control should be considered in the same manner. One community may tolerate more or less control of its police force than other communities. If police consolidation is deemed

⁸² White, “Cooperation not Consolidation,” 13.

⁸³ Ibid., 9.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 10.

⁸⁵ International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Consolidating.”

a better means to provide greater homeland defense and security, consideration to different levels of local control may be appropriate.

A model to establish local control in a consolidated police structure should be layered, allowing different communities to increase or decrease the level of control they desire by simply adding or removing different elements. This may be accomplished in a format that includes politicians, citizens, and police officials. The duties and responsibilities, along with the term served on the commission or board would be different for each consolidation. The following is a sample of some of these layers:

- Police Commission: A commission composed of an equal number of elected officials from each of the cities involved with the police consolidation.
- Board of Governors: A board consisting of each City Manager, or Mayor, representing each of the cities involved with the police consolidation.
- Citizen Review Board: A board consisting of several citizens from each of the cities involved with the police consolidation, appointed in equal number by the Police Commission, Board of Governors, and Chief of Police.
- Executive Board: A board consisting of the police chiefs from each of the cities involved with a services merger.

The next chapter is a case study on the Foothill Air Support Team (FAST), a merged air support police service in Los Angeles County. FAST is a model to increase counter terrorism capabilities across a broader spectrum.

V. A MODEL TO INCREASE CAPABILITIES: F.A.S.T.

A. INTRODUCTION

The Pasadena Police Department's helicopter has served its community since 1969. Since its inception, Pasadena officers have become reliant upon this airborne asset for all types of law enforcement necessities. With the primary mission of patrolling the skies of Pasadena, the helicopter has often responded to other jurisdictions to answer calls for assistance. Whether in its own city or not, these air patrols prevented the escape of fleeing criminals, provided back-up to ground officers in dire circumstances, conducted criminal surveillances, and provided an airborne platform to direct police operations.

In 1999, police chiefs from Azusa, Covina, Monrovia, Pasadena, and West Covina met to discuss the possibility of utilizing the Pasadena Police helicopter in a regional manner, providing air support to patrol officers on a regular basis. These police chiefs represented small municipalities in the eastern portion of Los Angeles County. In the past, they relied upon helicopters from the local sheriff, but over the years these services were reduced, rarely responding to calls in these cities. As a result, many of these jurisdictions relied upon Pasadena's helicopter for emergencies. It was the desire of this group to stretch helicopter services over a larger region to benefit their combined crime fighting effort. The police chiefs identified the need to devise some sort of regular air patrols for the specified reasons:

- The helicopter provided a safe means to follow and apprehend criminals who flee from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, creating a hazardous climate for police officers chasing in cars and for citizens on the ground.
- The helicopter allowed greater safety for citizens and police officers, as its response to a crime scene was expeditious.
- The helicopter was an effective and efficient way to conduct surveillances.
- The helicopter provided a way to coordinate ground responses to natural disasters, demonstrations, special events and other incidents as necessary.
- The helicopter was a police resource to provide speedy, preventative patrols to high-value infrastructure targets.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant (retired), Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section, Interview January 30, 2006.

These meetings resulted in a commitment to research and implement a multi-agency team that provided air support to patrol officers on a routine and proactive basis. While each city faced fiscal constraints at the time, these police leaders recognized the need to overcome such obstacles, as they viewed crime as a regional problem to be better solved by regional crime fighting.⁸⁷ They saw the helicopter as “an ounce of prevention,” and therefore rejected “a pound of cure” in the future.⁸⁸ These police chiefs realized that a collaborative airborne effort would benefit each of their communities, increasing overall capabilities. It was understood a strong and loyal partnership would be required to achieve the shared vision.⁸⁹

B. REGIONAL PLANNING COMMITTEE

In order to move this idea forward, an ad hoc committee was established to explore the structure and implementation of a regional program. Since inclusion was recognized to be an ingredient for success in this collaborative effort, the committee included representatives from all of the involved police agencies. With the Pasadena Police Department possessing expertise in the area of helicopter operations and the assets necessary for the new program, it was named to chair this committee.⁹⁰ A work plan to complete the following tasks was agreed upon by the members:

- Initiate a trial program to test the concept.
- Establish a cost for service.
- Devise a formula to equitably share costs among cities.
- Create a deployment schedule that meets the needs of each city.
- Identify necessary personnel resources, equipment, and training.
- Research and identify the most effective means to structure and formalize an agreement among the partners.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant (retired), Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section, Interview January 30, 2006.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant, Pasadena Police Department, Memorandum, “Regional Helicopter Program Trial” (September 13, 1999), 10.

C. TESTING THE CONCEPT

It was theorized that a short trial program would identify the strengths and weaknesses of the new service. The planning committee wanted to incrementally test the concept without the risk of a long-term commitment.⁹² Criteria were established to measure the program over a seven-week period. Data culled from the experiment would eventually determine a baseline service level, allowing a standard to be established. The following elements of the service were measured during the seven-week trial:

- The number of responses to each city.
- The number of helicopter initiated calls to each city.
- The average response time to each city.
- The number of helicopter assisted arrests for each city.
- The total number of citizen complaints.
- The number of calls resolved by the helicopter as Incident Report Only (IRO) with the assistance of ground officers.⁹³

In hindsight, the trial provided training and became an effective marketing tool for the program. Ground officers who never utilized air support were exposed to this resource and learned to use its advantages, gaining valuable on-the-job-training for this new resource. As air patrols assisted in the apprehension of criminals, the usefulness of the program was demonstrated to police personnel, community members, and politicians throughout the region, initiating interest from other cities.⁹⁴

1. Trial Results

The trial period began on July 30, 1999 and ended on September 11, 1999. Over the course of seven weeks, one Pasadena Police Department helicopter and crew covered fourteen eight-hour shifts. The personnel costs associated with the trial period were based upon the overtime rates of one pilot and one observer. Crews flew these missions on overtime to ensure the normal operation and services of the Pasadena helicopter to its local community. The trial air patrols occurred each Friday and Saturday night and were proactive in nature.

⁹² Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant, Pasadena Police Department, Memorandum, "Regional Helicopter Program Trial" (September 13, 1999), 10.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Tom Oldfield, Interview.

The cost of the trial period was divided among the participants based upon the number of response to each city. There was no contract, joint powers agreement, or written document for this experiment. Based upon the historical safety record of the Pasadena helicopters, the police chiefs who approved this trial accepted a calculated risk in order to implement the program. This was done to eliminate a protracted negotiation that would delay the experiment they wanted to conduct. Since Pasadena helicopters flew over these cities upon the request of assistance on a regular basis, it was the contention of these leaders the trial period constituted an experiment of “planned mutual aid.”⁹⁵ The outcome of the trial is explained below and summarized in Table 12.

Table 12. FAST Trial Results (1999)⁹⁶

| City | Calls | Avg. Response Time (seconds) | First on Scene | Incident Report Only | Arrests |
|--------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|
| Azusa | 35 | 88 | 15 | 0 | 2 |
| Monrovia | 48 | 88 | 28 | 1 | 2 |
| West Covina | 104 | 90 | 49 | 3 | 5 |
| Total | 187 | 89 | 92 | 4 | 9 |

The helicopter was able to respond to each request for service in less than ninety seconds. The normal response time for ground officers in these cities, for a range of priority calls, was five to fifteen minutes.⁹⁷ The helicopter enabled the cities to be much more responsive to its police officers and citizens. According to the results, the helicopter was the first on scene over 49% of the time when it was responding to the same calls as ground officers. This number is significant as the helicopter was covering three cities and still able to arrive before other officers half of the time. Because each of the crews had to learn new geography, the speedy responses proved to be surprising. In fourteen shifts, the helicopter either initiated an arrest or assisted on an arrest on nine occasions, making the average shift responsible or partly responsible for .64 arrests per shift. Since crews only fly four and a half hours of an eight-hour shift, the arrest numbers for the helicopter crew was nearly double when compared to a ground officer’s arrests per shift.

⁹⁵ Tom Oldfield, Interview.

⁹⁶ Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (July 30-September 11, 1999).

⁹⁷ Tom Oldfield, Memorandum.

The helicopter had many anecdotal successes that provided additional information for the trial period assessment. While responding to West Covina for a hit-and-run collision, the helicopter was able to locate the fleeing suspect vehicle nearly one-half mile from the original accident scene.⁹⁸ Under normal circumstances, the suspect would have been able to escape. As the helicopter assisted a single ground officer on a routine traffic stop, the crew observed a gang fight in the rear of an apartment complex several blocks away. Ground officers were notified and directed to the suspects.⁹⁹ In this case, the proactive nature of the helicopter and its ability to view the community from a new dimension prevented a more serious crime from occurring. During a burglary of a business in Monrovia, the helicopter provided surveillance of the suspected “getaway” vehicle. When the suspects left the crime scene, the helicopter followed them to their residence and directed ground officers to the location, resulting in two felony arrests.¹⁰⁰

One citizen complaint was received during the trial period. The complaining party was a resident of Monrovia who did not like the noise of the helicopter, regarding the airship as a nuisance. The resident was contacted by the lieutenant of the Pasadena Police Helicopter Section the following day. An explanation of the program was provided, along with a rudimentary overview of the benefits of having airborne police patrols. The citizen was invited to participate in a tour of the Pasadena heliport and offered a helicopter ride to better understand how police officers in the sky added value to the overall police mission. After being exposed to the program, the citizen rescinded his complaint and told the lieutenant he believed the program would be very beneficial to Monrovia.¹⁰¹ The Pasadena Police Department did not handle all of its helicopter noise complaints in this manner. However, the lieutenant in charge of the section understood the importance of citizen acceptance of the new program. He understood that a small group of angry citizens had the ability to thwart the regional helicopter initiative.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (July 30-September 11, 1999).

⁹⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Tom Oldfield, Interview.

¹⁰² Ibid.

Some of the most significant but simple data culled from the trial period concerned the issue of cost sharing. It was clear from the statistics each city received a disproportionate number of services relative to the other, but the services received were closely matched to each city's population when compared as a percentage to the total population of all the cities. This is shown in Table 13. Azusa made up 24% of the total population and consumed 19% of the services; Monrovia equaled 21% of the total population and utilized 26% of the services; West Covina comprised 55% of the total population and used exactly 55% of the services during the trial period. The relationship between population percentage and the percentage of total calls was important as it ultimately was the basis of the cost-sharing model devised for the permanent program.

Table 13. FAST Population and Response Comparison (1999 Trial Period)¹⁰³

| City | Population | Population Percentage | Responses | Percentage of Total Calls |
|--------------|-------------------|------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| Azusa | 45,700 | 24% | 35 | 19% |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 21% | 48 | 26% |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 55% | 104 | 55% |
| Total | 192,750 | 100% | 187 | 100% |

2. Lessons Learned

While the trial program was being touted a success, there were a number of lessons learned that required further attention and/or necessitated immediate change. If the experiment was to successfully morph into a permanent program, solutions to these problems would need to be identified and implemented.

Throughout the seven weeks, the cities struggled with communication between the various dispatch centers, helicopter, and ground officers.¹⁰⁴ Since the three police departments possessed dissimilar radio frequencies, it was impossible for the helicopter crew to listen to each. Even with the helicopter radio placed in a scanning mode, listening to each of the frequencies at one time, simultaneous transmissions were covered by each other and not heard by the helicopter crew. As a backup to the radio, the crew possessed a paging device worn by the observer for secondary contact from the three dispatch centers. However, this proved too cumbersome, slow, and difficult to read at night. This

¹⁰³ Tom Oldfield, Memorandum.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

communication system, or lack thereof, caused problems during each shift of the trial period.¹⁰⁵ To become more effective, the regional group required radio interoperability.

Noticeably missing in the trial program was a designated liaison between the helicopter crew and crime fighters of the three agencies. Under normal circumstances, an observer assigned to a helicopter would be required to maintain daily contact with all police department sections in order to gain knowledge of wanted suspects, cars, and locations where crimes occurred. This allowed the helicopter crew to plan and target specific areas for proactive patrol. Since the regional observer was from Pasadena, it was difficult to maintain contact with all the other cities. The regional group required some sort of liaison between each of the police departments and the helicopter crew to better utilize the crew's flight time when they were not responding to calls for service.¹⁰⁶

3. Trial Recommendation

At the conclusion of the trial and a full assessment of the data, the planning committee unanimously supported the creation of a permanent program. It also recommended the regional program be named the Foothill Air Support Team (FAST). They made the following recommendations:

- Establish the cost of the program for each city.
- Provide training to all patrol personnel from each of the cities to enhance the use of the program.
- Identify a radio procedure or new equipment to create greater communication capabilities among partner cities.
- Select and train two officers from each member city to become crew members (observers) on a regular basis, linking the regional crew to each agency, increasing information sharing in order to more efficiently fight crime.
- Research the availability of an airborne mapping device that allowed the helicopter crews to easily navigate Los Angeles County.
- Create a Joint Powers Agreement (JPA) to legalize the formation of a regional helicopter team.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Tom Oldfield, Memorandum.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

D. ESTABLISHING COST

The cost per hour for helicopter flight time was an estimate derived from the Direct Operating Cost (DOC) figures obtained from the aircraft manufacturer adjusted for the savings realized by participation in the General Services Administration (GSA) 1122 program¹⁰⁸ and 1033 military surplus¹⁰⁹ program utilized by the Pasadena Police Department. The hourly cost of the aircraft was calculated for a Bell OH-58 turbine engine helicopter that was slated to be used. This cost included jet fuel, maintenance and repairs. This estimated cost was calculated using two years of historical operating information and found to be \$130 per hour.¹¹⁰

To determine the calculation for hourly crew costs (one pilot and one observer), the committee utilized the Pasadena Police Department's current (fiscal year 1999) pilot and observer overtime pay rates. As the committee struggled with a deployment schedule, it determined there were not enough trained pilots and observers to fly patrol missions for FAST while maintaining the necessary services to the City of Pasadena. Thus, an overtime rate was necessary as crews flew on their days off. The current overtime hourly rate (fiscal year 1999) for the crew was \$86 per hour.¹¹¹ Miscellaneous hourly operating costs were also calculated by the ad hoc committee. These were defined to include the heliport facility, catastrophic flight and liability insurance, along with an administrative oversight fee. These costs were determined to be \$48 per hour.¹¹² Due to mandated aircraft inspections and flight preparation, along with the need to complete flight logs, training, and necessary refueling that takes place each shift, the average helicopter is in operation for only four and a half hours per eight-hour shift. Thus, to

¹⁰⁸ Section 1122 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 established the authority for state and local governments to purchase law enforcement equipment through federal procurement channels, provided the equipment is used in the performance of counter drug activities.

¹⁰⁹ Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997 authorized the Department of Defense to transfer excess military property to state and local law enforcement agencies. The eligible agencies in law enforcement activities are government agencies whose primary function is the enforcement of applicable federal, state and local laws, and whose compensated law enforcement officers have powers of arrest and apprehension. Preference is given to counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.

¹¹⁰ Christopher O. Vicino, Commander, Special Operations Division, Pasadena Police Department, Memorandum, "Regional Helicopter Presentation to City Council" (April 10, 2000), 5.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

calculate the cost of an eight-hour shift for a FAST helicopter, the hourly crew cost of \$86 was multiplied by eight, while the other hourly costs described above were multiplied by four and a half. The sum of these two calculations equated to a total cost per shift of \$1,490. Based on this rate, one shift per week was \$77,507 and two shifts per week were \$155,015 annually.¹¹³ The executives of FAST opted for a deployment based on two weekly night shifts.¹¹⁴

E. COST SHARING

One of the most challenging aspects for the project team was to devise an equitable cost sharing model to establish a way for each city to only pay for the services it received. The group did not want to create a formula that simply divided the total costs of services equally among the represented cities. It was understood that some cities would utilize the services of the helicopter patrol more often than other cities based upon individual crime trends, demographics, and calls for service. The challenge was to devise a simple way to achieve cost sharing without causing inequity or confusion. A formula was put forth based upon each city's percentage of the aggregate population of all cities involved. This percentage was then used to calculate each city's contribution by applying the same percentage to the total cost of air services per year. These percentages were found to be equitable during the trial period; thus it was the assumption of the project team that percentage of population would equal the percentage of total calls for services. For example, since the City of Arcadia equaled 17.96% of the combined FAST cities population, it was theorized that this city would gain the same percentage of helicopter services each year, and thus be charged 17.96% of the total annual costs for the program, or \$27,840. Table 14 provides a summary of the FAST cost sharing formula at the inception of FAST in 2000, along with the total annual cost of the program established based upon two shifts per week (\$155,015).

¹¹³ Vicino, Memorandum, 5.

¹¹⁴ Foothill Air Support Team, Meeting Agenda and Minutes (September 25, 2000), 2.

Table 14. FAST Population and Cost Summary for Two Weekly Shifts (2000) ¹¹⁵

| City | Population | Percentage of Population | Annual Cost |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 17.96% | \$27,840 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 15.60% | \$24,188 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 16.23% | \$25,157 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 13.85% | \$21,462 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 36.36% | \$56,368 |
| Total | 292,880 | 100% | \$155,015 |

The City of Pasadena was not included in this formula. Since it possessed its own helicopter patrol, the leadership of this agency did not want to reduce services to its community by sharing a single airship with six other municipalities. The initial plan called for Pasadena to maintain its own helicopter within its city boundaries while deploying a second helicopter to patrol all FAST cities.¹¹⁶

F. JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT (JPA)

A legal mechanism was sought to make FAST an individual organization, separate from the six member cities. A simple memorandum of understanding was not recommended as it only created a binding agreement for services and did not create an independent entity recognized by law.¹¹⁷ A Joint Powers Agreement (JPA) granted the involved municipalities the power to form a singular body while retaining their current status as cities. The JPA also allowed for the creation of a common treasury, which was required in order to properly manage the commingled municipal funds. The creation of the JPA was a long and tedious process that would involve the combined efforts of each municipality's legal teams. A JPA would take into account the needs of all the cities, requiring the unanimous approval of the assigned legal teams, along with support from the affected city managers, elected officials, and chiefs of police.

The FAST JPA required eleven months to be research, altered, reviewed, and signed. It established the governance structure of FAST, calling for a Board of Governors (city managers) and Executive Committee (police chiefs). The governors

¹¹⁵ Foothill Air Support Team, Meeting Agenda and Minutes (September 25, 2000), 7.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 1.

¹¹⁷ Larry Newberry, Assistant City Attorney, City of Pasadena, Interview with the author, May 7, 2000.

were charged with policymaking and budget approval and met twice each year to review the program. The committee was given the power to make decisions on a day-to-day basis concerning overall operations and met monthly. The Executive Committee possessed a Chair, Vice Chair, Secretary, and Treasurer. These officers of the committee were elected to one-year terms the governors and committee members.¹¹⁸

G. IDENTIFYING THE PROPER DEPLOYMENT

The Arcadia Police Department's crime analysis unit provided an analysis to accurately prescribe the correct deployment of the helicopter. A review of each agency's calls for service was conducted to ascertain the most appropriate days of the week and time for the new program to be effectively scheduled. Since only two shifts were going to be flown, it was important to provide coverage for the busiest days and times. Calls for service were sorted by type of crime or incident, day of week, and time of day and cross-referenced by each agency. From analyzing the data, two days of the week and time appeared to be the most relevant for each city: Friday and Saturday nights. The time identified for service was between 4:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m.¹¹⁹ Since Pasadena Police Department pilots and observers were to be utilized by FAST, the deployment days and times had to be limited in order to not overburden personnel with excessive overtime. With this in mind, this initial schedule was adopted for the new program.¹²⁰

H. ECONOMIES OF SCALE

The FAST program results are summarized in this section. They have been compiled to demonstrate the potential for increasing counter-terrorism capabilities among local law enforcement jurisdictions through the consolidation of specific services. These statistics include evidence of economies of scale, a pertinent and necessary by-product of resource sharing if such a model is to be utilized to fight terrorism. Such cost savings are disputed in the current literature concerning police consolidation and service mergers, but appear to be evident in the FAST model. They are important, as they allow saved money to be expended on additional counter terror resources or initiatives to provide even greater security from terrorism.

¹¹⁸ Foothill Air Support Team, *Joint Powers Agreement* (August 1, 2000), 2-9.

¹¹⁹ Captain Bob Sanderson, Arcadia Police Department, Memorandum, "FAST Helicopter Call for Service Time Survey" (September 26, 2000), 1-10.

¹²⁰ Foothill Air Support Team, Meeting and Agenda Minutes.

Table 15 summarizes the first five months of FAST. Once again, the consistent relationship between the “percentage of population” and the “percentage of total calls” is observed. Each city’s percentage of population is ± 5 percentage points of the percentage of total calls. The FAST executives determined this to be an acceptable range to continue using this formula. Amazingly, the airship was able to respond to calls on an average of fifty seconds or less: thirty-nine seconds faster when compared to the seven-week trial period. It was theorized that the crew was becoming more accustomed to the geography of these cities, allowing them to navigate and respond more quickly.

Table 15. FAST Statistics 2000 (Aug. to Dec.)¹²¹

| City | Population | Percentage of Population | Annual Cost | Calls per City | Percentage of Total Calls | Response Time Avg. (sec.) | First on Scene | Incident Report Only | Arrests |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------------|-----------|
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 17.96% | \$27,840 | 83 | 14.58% | 44 | 31 | 23 | 4 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 15.60% | \$24,188 | 97 | 17.05% | 53 | 25 | 18 | 9 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 16.23% | \$25,157 | 87 | 15.29% | 44 | 24 | 12 | 3 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 13.85% | \$21,462 | 98 | 17.22% | 41 | 23 | 17 | 7 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 36.36% | \$56,368 | 204 | 35.86% | 71 | 37 | 38 | 15 |
| Total | 292,880 | 100% | \$155,015 | 569 | 100% | 50 | 140 | 108 | 38 |

Tables 16 and 17 are provided to demonstrate economies of scale occurring in the FAST model. These tables compare the same twelve-month periods of the program in 2001 and 2002. With the City of Alhambra joining FAST in mid-2001, costs were decreased to each agency by an average of 4.74%. Calls for service increased by 103%, documented in the column labeled “calls per city.” Average response time decreased from sixty-eight to sixty-two seconds. Remarkably, FAST doubled its output over this time period and was still able to respond to calls more quickly. Last, the helicopter increased its involvement in arrests from forty-one to 106, or 158%.

¹²¹ Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (August-December 2000).

Table 16. FAST Statistics 2001 (Jan. to Dec.)¹²²

| City | Population | Percentage of Total Population | Annual Cost | Calls per City | Percentage of Total Calls | Response Time Avg. (sec.) | First on Scene | Incident Report Only | Arrests |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------------|-----------|
| Alhambra | 91,000 | 23.70% | \$36,738 | 102 | 10.54% | 45 | 29 | 9 | 4 |
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 13.71% | \$21,253 | 110 | 11.36% | 60 | 81 | 21 | 3 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 11.91% | \$18,462 | 209 | 21.59% | 71 | 69 | 34 | 8 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 12.38% | \$19,191 | 121 | 12.51% | 77 | 52 | 26 | 6 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 10.56% | \$16,369 | 88 | 9.09% | 69 | 25 | 24 | 5 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 27.74% | \$43,002 | 338 | 34.91% | 89 | 49 | 66 | 15 |
| Total | 383,880 | 100% | \$155,015 | 968 | 100% | 68 | 305 | 180 | 41 |

Table 17. FAST Statistics 2002 (Jan. to Dec.)¹²³

| City | Population | Percentage of Total Population | Annual Cost | Calls per City | Percentage of Total Calls | Response Time Avg. (sec.) | First on Scene | Incident Report Only | Arrests |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------------|
| Alhambra | 91,000 | 23.70% | \$36,738 | 332 | 16.91% | 79 | 56 | 112 | 13 |
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 13.71% | \$21,253 | 253 | 12.88% | 49 | 51 | 102 | 9 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 11.91% | \$18,462 | 273 | 13.91% | 64 | 71 | 109 | 18 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 12.38% | \$19,191 | 292 | 14.86% | 73 | 50 | 145 | 11 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 10.56% | \$16,369 | 311 | 15.83% | 55 | 44 | 155 | 19 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 27.74% | \$43,002 | 503 | 25.61% | 62 | 104 | 229 | 23 |
| Total | 383,880 | 100% | \$155,015 | 1964 | 100% | 62 | 383 | 855 | 106 |

Since Alhambra joined FAST in mid-year, its percentage of population was out of synch with its percentage of total population for 2001. The relationship between these two percentages regained its ± 5 percentage ratio in its first full year of participation, as seen in Table 17.

While Tables 16 and 17 do not reflect a change in mission, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks altered the FAST program. The regional helicopter took on an additional duty: providing for greater prevention and protection from terrorism. This was achieved by utilizing the helicopter to make preventative patrols to each city's high risk infrastructure targets, flying surveillance missions for counter-terrorism investigations, and using its regional framework to further information sharing and communication as it related to possible threats.

¹²² Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January -December 2001).

¹²³ Ibid.

In 2003, the FAST budget was augmented to reflect a 7.5% increase in salaries and a 150% jump in the price of jet fuel.¹²⁴ Additionally, the helicopter was found to average thirty calls for service each month on non-FAST operational days. While the Pasadena chief of police initially authorized this additional service to be absorbed by his police department, it was an economic burden. Thus, the cost of these services was calculated into the new cost of FAST.¹²⁵ Beginning in 2003, the FAST executives authorized an annual cost increase of \$98,641, making the total annual cost of service \$253,656, or 64% higher than the previous year, as noted in Table 18. This was an average cost increase of \$16,440 to each city. For the two largest municipalities, West Covina and Alhambra, it meant an increase of \$27,362 and \$23,378, respectively, based upon the cost-sharing model.

Table 18. FAST Statistics 2003 (Jan. to Dec.)¹²⁶

| City | Population | Percentage of Total Population | Annual Cost | Calls per City | Percentage of Total Calls | Response Time Avg. (sec.) | First on Scene | Incident Report Only | Arrests |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------------|
| Alhambra | 91,000 | 23.70% | \$60,116 | 347 | 16.25% | 63 | 64 | 165 | 8 |
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 13.71% | \$34,776 | 224 | 10.49% | 58 | 63 | 125 | 9 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 11.91% | \$30,211 | 377 | 17.64% | 60 | 92 | 147 | 23 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 12.38% | \$31,403 | 344 | 16.11% | 63 | 78 | 199 | 15 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 10.56% | \$26,786 | 323 | 15.12% | 61 | 64 | 179 | 14 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 27.74% | \$70,364 | 521 | 24.39% | 76 | 140 | 219 | 31 |
| Total | 383,880 | 100% | \$253,656 | 2,136 | 100% | 61 | 511 | 1039 | 105 |

The 2003 FAST statistics captured in Table 18 represent an all-time high in the area of calls for service (2,136) for the program. This is an increase of 8.75% from the previous year. Helicopter involved arrests remained consistent, along with the average response time to calls. The crew and helicopter arrived first on scene more times in 2003 than any other previous year. This was attributed to a shortage of personnel in patrol during this time period for each of the cities.¹²⁷

Table 19 substantiates an emerging trend for FAST. The relationship between percentage of total population and percentage of total calls for the City of Alhambra were

¹²⁴ Vicino, Memorandum, 1-5.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 2-3.

¹²⁶ Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January -December 2003).

¹²⁷ Tom Oldfield, Interview.

inconsistent with the cost sharing model two years in a row. It appeared that Alhambra was either underutilizing the program, or the city's call types did not require the response of air support.

Table 19. FAST Statistics 2004 (Jan. to Dec.)¹²⁸

| City | Population | Percentage of Total Population | Annual Cost | Calls per City | Percentage of Total Calls | Response Time Avg. (sec.) | First on Scene | Incident Report Only | Arrests |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------------|
| Alhambra | 91,000 | 23.70% | \$60,116 | 266 | 15.37% | 67 | 51 | 54 | 7 |
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 13.71% | \$34,776 | 221 | 12.77% | 55 | 59 | 79 | 12 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 11.91% | \$30,211 | 254 | 14.68% | 86 | 79 | 59 | 29 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 12.38% | \$31,403 | 284 | 16.41% | 72 | 81 | 87 | 25 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 10.56% | \$26,786 | 239 | 13.80% | 52 | 31 | 79 | 18 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 27.74% | \$70,364 | 467 | 26.97% | 87 | 156 | 93 | 23 |
| Total | 383,880 | 100% | \$253,656 | 1731 | 100% | 69 | 483 | 457 | 115 |

While the number of total calls appeared to decrease for 2003, the reduced number is attributed to a reporting procedure instituted during the year.¹²⁹ Crews were instructed not to report self initiated calls in the incident report only (IRO) category any longer. This resulted in a 56% reduction for the year in IRO calls when compared to 2003, impacting the total number of calls per city. The number helicopter involved arrests increased by 9.5%, with most other categories remaining relatively similar to the previous year.

In late 2005, the City of San Marino joined the FAST program. Because this municipality only possesses a population of 13,217, it did not reduce costs significantly for the other members. However, it demonstrated the desire possessed by other area cities to increase overall capabilities in the area of crime fighting and counter terrorism. For the most part, the statistics for 2005 remained similar to previous years, with Alhambra continuing to outside the norm as it relates to the cost sharing formula.

¹²⁸ Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January-December 2004).

¹²⁹ Bob Mulhall, Lieutenant, Pasadena Police Department, Air Operations Section, Interview, January 3, 2006.

Table 20. FAST Statistics 2005 (Jan. to Dec.)¹³⁰

| City | Population | Percentage of Total Population | Annual Cost | Calls per City | Percentage of Total Calls | Response Time Avg. (sec.) | First on Scene | Incident Report Only | Arrests |
|--------------|----------------|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------------|
| Alhambra | 91,000 | 22.92% | \$58,137 | 170 | 11.55% | 81 | 33 | 89 | 6 |
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 13.25% | \$33,609 | 174 | 11.81% | 66 | 40 | 70 | 4 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 11.51% | \$29,195 | 227 | 15.41% | 84 | 59 | 86 | 10 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 11.96% | \$30,337 | 276 | 18.73% | 96 | 68 | 132 | 17 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 10.22% | \$25,923 | 202 | 13.71% | 72 | 41 | 76 | 21 |
| San Marino | 13,217 | 3.32% | \$8,116 | 24 | 1.52% | 126 | 2 | 33 | 2 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 26.82% | \$68,030 | 401 | 27.27% | 91 | 131 | 175 | 27 |
| Total | 397,097 | 100% | \$253,656 | 1474 | 100% | 82 | 393 | 661 | 101 |

Projected cost overruns for 2006 required the FAST Board of Governors to approve an increased budget for fiscal year 2006-2007.¹³¹ These overages were caused by a 20% increase in salaries over the past three and a half years, along with a 150% increase in the cost of jet fuel. The board approved an annual budget in the amount of \$322,608.¹³² This constituted an increase of 27%.

However, with the cities of Glendora and South Pasadena joining FAST in 2006, most of these projected cost increases are minimized. With the addition of the two new members, the total population of citizens served by FAST increases from 397,097 to 475,259. Because the cost-sharing model is based upon the percentage of population represented by each of the cities, the cost increase calculated of 27% is balanced by a population increase of 20%.

Table 21 depicts the cost sharing formula for 2006 with the additional members to FAST. The percentages of population have decreased, maintaining a reasonable level of increase to each city.

Table 21. 2006 Projected FAST Population and Cost Summary

| Agency | Population | Percentage of Total Population | Annual Cost |
|----------|------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Alhambra | 91,000 | 19.15% | \$61,779 |
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 11.07% | \$35,712 |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 9.61% | \$31,002 |

¹³⁰ Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January-December 2005).

¹³¹ Rod Uyeda, Commander, Special Operations Division, Pasadena Police Department, Memorandum, "Cost Adjustment Report" (September 1, 2005), 1-7.

¹³² Ibid.

| | | | |
|----------------|----------------|-------------|------------------|
| Glendora | 52,373 | 11.02% | \$35,551 |
| Covina | 47,530 | 10.00% | \$32,260 |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 8.53% | \$27,518 |
| San Marino | 13,217 | 2.78% | \$8,968 |
| South Pasadena | 25,789 | 5.43% | \$17,517 |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 22.41% | \$72,296 |
| Total | 475,259 | 100% | \$322,608 |

Since the 20% cost enhancement is shared among the members and balanced by the new participating cities, it resulted in the following minimal annual increases: Alhambra \$3,642; Arcadia \$2,103; Azusa \$1,807; Covina \$1,923; Monrovia \$1,595; San Marino \$852; and West Covina \$4,266. It appears the economies of scale observed in the first two years continue to hold in the program's sixth year.

I. CREATING A REGIONAL CULTURE

The success of the FAST program is directly linked to its methodology as it relates to the creation of a regional atmosphere. The leadership of FAST devised a strategy and day-to-day philosophy of inclusion and shared power. These police chiefs set the tone for sharing and collaborating in an unprecedented manner. Their subordinates followed and established strong working relationships with each member city. Without buy-in and direct involvement from these top executives, this program would not have achieved success. In addition to this strong leadership, there were several key initiatives that also assisted in creating a culture of sharing among these cities:

- Monthly meetings were established for the Board of Directors (chiefs of police) and alternates (operational commanders).
- A bi-annual meeting was established for the Board of Governance (City Managers).
- Each of the cities provided personnel resources to be trained as crewmembers (observers). After being properly trained, these observers were assigned shifts in an equal rotation. They provided FAST with a liaison among departments, improving information sharing, communication, and teamwork.
- A FAST logo was created for the two regional helicopters. It included the names of each city. The logos were prominently displayed on the assigned air ships.
- A separate FAST uniform patch was developed for the flight crews.

- The Pasadena chief of police authorized the Pasadena Police helicopter responses to emergency priority calls to the other member cities during non-FAST hours in order to demonstrate the willingness to share this resource.
- The Pasadena chief of police authorized the Pasadena Police helicopter to appear at community events in all member cities in order to garner support from citizens and politicians.
- The structure of governance provided equal voting power and an annual rotation of prominent positions on the Executive Board and Board of Governors.
- The West Covina chief of police authorized his department's assigned observer to begin training to become a pilot, the first non-Pasadena crewmember to fly the FAST ships.

FAST leadership has found a way to contain and overcome the turf battles historically prevalent between law enforcement agencies. It appears they have put aside the ego driven decision making that is common in the police profession and replaced it with a “good of the cause” mentality that supports the growth of crime fighting and counter-terrorism capabilities.

J. NEXT STEPS

Additional cities have demonstrated interest in joining FAST. Table 22 provides a list of the current member cities and other municipalities that have expressed a desire to join in the future. The population percentages (cost sharing percentages) for each have been identified and calculated as a percentage of the total. If this was the future of FAST, accommodating this large collaborative effort for helicopter services would require “thinking anew”. Consideration would need to be given to deploying two helicopters for each shift while adding the City of Pasadena to the cost sharing equation. This would require Pasadena to share helicopter services, abandoning the deployment of an individual ship assigned solely to its own jurisdiction. If this next step were completed, it would truly regionalize police air support services in Los Angeles County, stretching counter terrorism capabilities even further. Reduced costs would be gained by all of the involved partners. For example, the City of West Covina would decrease its annual payment from 22.41% to 8.80%, reducing its cost by nearly 65%.

Table 22. The Future of FAST

| Agency | Population | Percentage of Total Population |
|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Alhambra | 91,000 | 7.52% |
| Arcadia | 52,600 | 4.35% |
| Azusa | 45,700 | 3.77% |
| Burbank | 105,300 | 8.71% |
| Covina | 47,530 | 3.94% |
| Duarte | 21,486 | 1.78% |
| Glendale | 199,178 | 16.47% |
| Glendora | 52,373 | 4.34% |
| El Monte | 115,965 | 9.59% |
| Monrovia | 40,550 | 3.35% |
| Pasadena | 142,000 | 11.75% |
| Pomona | 150,000 | 12.41% |
| San Marino | 13,217 | 1.09% |
| South Pasadena | 25,789 | 2.13% |
| West Covina | 106,500 | 8.80% |
| Total | 1,209,188 | 100% |

The FAST model is applicable to police services that may be shared among jurisdictions. Why not construct the same-shared principles for local counter terrorism investigations, dual use canines (bomb and drug detecting), or the building of radio and computer interoperability? FAST is a flexible template that should be used as a national model to improve counter terrorism capabilities among jurisdictions, in line with the NPG.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY

The approximate 750,000 American police officers on the job today are considered an important element of the overall terrorism prevention and protection apparatus established after September 11, 2001. However, the current structure of policing deludes the potency of these resources and needs to be reshaped in order to maximize these human assets, establishing the best possible defense against terrorism. With nearly 18,000 police departments in the United States, the number of overlapping services and police responsibilities have become overwhelming and a hindrance to the war on terrorism. Police resources within every state are being wasted as jurisdictional responsibilities are duplicated among agencies. Local police should be restructured to maximize resources, potentially expanding capabilities for the dual purpose of fighting crime and terrorism.

With over 52% of the United States law enforcement agencies possessing less than 10 full-time police officers¹³³, the overall American strategy to defend against terrorism is diminished as these smaller police departments lack the resources to properly staff, train, and equip any of the elements necessary to effectively prevent, protect, and respond to an attack. While this thesis has identified numerous government studies concluding American policing is far too decentralized, the recommended solutions to reduce fragmentation and overlap have not been carried out. Does it make sense to use the framework of policing that was devised in the late 1800s? Today's society requires a new model of policing. One that is adaptive, resilient, and able to provide the best possible defense from terrorism. Alterations to the American police model have not occurred on a broad scale for two specific reasons:

- A lack of empirical data showing a centralized form of policing to be more effective and efficient than the current decentralized model.
- The real or perceived desire of citizens and/or politicians to retain local control of police agencies.

¹³³ U.S. Department of Justice, *Census*, 3.

However, this thesis has produced anecdotal information from panel interviews and data synthesized from previously conducted citizen surveys suggesting the acceptance level of consolidating police organizations or services is higher than properly credited in most research. The belief that citizens have a great desire to control the local police force was questioned with the results obtained from the 1973 Kansas City Preventative Patrol study, as data obtained from this experiment suggested citizens are not impacted or even notice a change of police operations at the patrol level. These results diminish the issue of local control by making relevant the following question: If citizens do not notice the changes occurring in the local police force, how much control are they truly exercising? How much control do they truly need or want?

The panel interviews also produced an onslaught of interesting emerging trends and possible future events that would potentially alter law enforcement's configuration, impacting how police would combat terrorism. Some of the trends and events positively impact the development of a consolidated police model, while other trends and events hinder the models implementation.

The following trends and events identified by the panels were projected to have the most positive impact, increasing the likelihood of a consolidated police model:

- Tr-1(Professional Panel): Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs.
- Tr-4 (Professional Panel): The cost of police personnel.
- Tr-5(Law Enforcement Panel): The number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments.
- Ev-1(Professional Panel): A second large terrorist attack on the United States.
- Ev-5(Professional Panel): Police officers forming a statewide union.
- Ev-2(Law Enforcement Panel): A Bio-terrorism attack on the United States.

Conversely, the following trends and events identified by the panels were projected to have the most negative impact, decreasing the likelihood of a consolidated police model:

- Tr-3(Professional Panel): The desire to have local control of police.
- Tr-1(Law Enforcement Panel): The number of differing benefit packages among police departments.
- Tr-2(Law Enforcement Panel): The number of community oversight bodies governing police departments.

- Tr-4(Law Enforcement Panel): The desire for politicians to have local control of police.
- Ev-1(Law Enforcement Panel): A Second great depression.
- Ev-5(Law Enforcement Panel): A major police corruption scandal.

The FAST case study demonstrated an effective way to increase counter terrorism capabilities as it provided an equitable cost sharing formula and implementation model that may be duplicated nationally. FAST may be copied for functional consolidations, reducing duplication and redundancy in police services within a given region. FAST has overcome the traditional turf battles that often occur among contiguous police agencies, reinforcing the notion that cooperation and coordination has always been possible.

B. THE EXPERIENCE OF CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG

An interview with Assistant Chief David Stephens of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) was conducted for this thesis. Chief Stephens has served 30 years with the CMPD and was an integral member of the planning team when the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County consolidated police services in 1992. Considering his role in this process, his professional observations and experiences involving the issues of police consolidation provide important insight for this research.

The city-county merger of police services between Charlotte and Mecklenburg County resulted from a tax inequity between city and county residents.¹³⁴ Because the two jurisdictions shared 80% of the same geographical area, the two entities possessed overlapping responsibilities and services. Based upon the taxes levied, city residents supplied greater financial support for police services, while county residents were able to glean the same benefits and utilize police services without the same tax burden.¹³⁵ Merging the city and county law enforcement departments projected a reduction in taxes for the average citizen.

The impetus for the consolidation of police services between Charlotte and Mecklenburg County came from the citizens, not the local politicians.¹³⁶ While the

¹³⁴ Assistant Chief David Stephens, Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department, Interview (December 30, 2005).

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

mayor of Charlotte supported the idea of merging services, the majority of elected officials resisted the effort, attempting to dissuade constituencies from supporting it.¹³⁷ The observations during this consolidation supported data culled from the NGT process of this thesis and previously conducted citizen satisfaction surveys regarding consolidation: A citizen's level of tolerance for consolidation of police services is much higher than previous research suggested and is dissimilar to the ideals projected by most local politicians.

While the consolidation of the CMPD created an equitable sharing of taxes among area residents, it is unclear whether or not the merger reduced the overall cost of police services. With the city increasing its population by over 200,000 residents between 1992 and 2005, the cost of police services has increased with population and service demands.¹³⁸ After the merger, CMPD experienced a lower crime rate. This was attributed to greater coordination of law enforcement resources within the jurisdiction.¹³⁹ Investigations that impacted the entire region that had been previously difficult to manage among the many small police agencies in the county were now consolidated into one investigation. Communication and the sharing of information were normalized with the merger. The overall effectiveness of the police department was increased.¹⁴⁰

The CMPD has increased its counter terrorism capabilities as a result of the consolidation.¹⁴¹ Through the merger, personnel resources were increased; greater coordination, cooperation and sharing were gained; and, an interoperable computer and radio system was designed. The combination of these changes has allowed CMPD to provide greater protection from terrorism for its community.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Stephens, Interview.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

C. POLICY OPTIONS

For the purpose of this thesis, three policy options have been created, along with a recommendation for consideration. These options involve maintaining the status quo, merging police services, or forming a national police force.

1. Maintain Status Quo

When contemplating different policy options to address existing problems, doing nothing, or remaining status quo, is always an alternative. This is true for the issue being researched in this thesis. Thus, the first option for consideration is to retain the decentralized police model in its current form. If this option is selected, several strategic initiatives are necessary to reduce or eliminate some of the major challenges created by today's policing structure. These initiatives will allow for an acceptable level of counter-terrorism capabilities within the framework of the current police model.

Great priority should be given to closing the technological gap that exists among local police departments. Fusing police technologies would increase communication capabilities and induce information sharing. This may be achieved through the creation of national policies to standardize radio equipment and infrastructure, along with police computer systems. This is being done in some realms, but not in others. This inconsistent approach amplifies an already challenging issue. To illustrate, an example is provided from the Federal Communication Commission (FCC).

a. Standardize Radio Infrastructure

The FCC continues to standardize radio frequencies for public safety agencies across the United States in order to facilitate communication among first responders. The preservation of this spectrum assures police, fire, and emergency medical services non-interference from private broadcasts, increasing the effective and efficient flow of pertinent information among users. With this policy, the FCC provides priority to first responders. Contrary to this ideal, the FCC does not standardize radio infrastructure components for public safety. This has resulted in the use of competing technology and the building of disparate radio systems incapable of being linked together. This reduces the first responders' ability to properly communicate across jurisdictional lines, making the standardization of frequencies irrelevant.

A current example of this exists within Los Angeles County as several independent cities and the county are concurrently devise an interoperable radio system for the region. The cities are building the Interagency Communications Interoperability System (ICIS) while the county is constructing the Los Angeles Regional Tactical Communications System (LARTCS). ICIS is utilizing “trunking” technology that allows the sharing of a small number of communications paths among a large number of users, managed by proprietary software. ICIS is a digital system and may not be blended with an analog radio system. LARTCS uses current and past technologies with existing radio backbones by installing repeaters that merge disparate radio frequencies. LARTCS is an analog system that may not be blended with a digital system. Establishing a national policy to standardize radio systems eliminates duplication and the development of competing radio infrastructures that are unable to work together. Divergent technologies only widen the communication and information-sharing gap that already exists among the many law enforcement agencies. While these separate entities construct different radio systems, they run the risk of failure as they seek funding from the same sources. It would be more sensible to work together on such an interoperable radio project, allowing for the sharing of resources and not diluting funding opportunities with multiple initiatives.

b. Standardize Computer Systems

If police departments are to remain independent of each other, and the status quo remains, a national policy for the standardization of law enforcement computer systems is a necessary strategic initiative to overcome the information sharing obstacles that are inherent in the decentralized police model.

The 9/11 Commission indicated that federal law enforcement organizations around the country did not have the technological capacity to access other agency databases.¹⁴³ The federal government consolidated most of its law enforcement and intelligence entities under one departmental umbrella to cope with this problem. Local police do not share information with each other very well either. While access to

¹⁴³ 9/11 Commission Report, 245-257.

national databases exist and are shared for missing persons, warrants, and runaway juveniles, most city and county police agencies possess dissimilar computer systems that are incapable of being linked together.

As most police departments possess a Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), Records Management System (RMS) and Mobile Data Computer (MDC) solution to manage information, these computer modules are not linked to neighboring police agencies. In other words, local cops cannot access each other's information. In fact, the computer systems within local police agencies are so dissimilar that initiating an interface among all of them is unfathomable. These circumstances are the direct result of the decentralized police model.

Without greater technological fusion linking police agencies, adequate communication and the sharing of critical information will remain difficult at best. If the status quo is an acceptable policy option, the minimal alteration to the current system would be the standardization of radio equipment/infrastructure and computer systems. At the very least, this would allow the many police departments within a given area the ability to communicate and share.

2. Consolidate Police Services

Identifying and eliminating the overlapping services among area police agencies through consolidation potentially results in a monetary savings relating to personnel costs. This is a means to fight terrorism more effectively without merging entire police organizations as the monies saved may be utilized for additional training, personnel, or equipment to bolster counter terrorism capabilities. By joining forces in such a manner, police departments are able to achieve together what they could not individually. The FAST model from Chapter V demonstrates the potential of collaborative efforts and the possible positive impact to a larger region of communities. The Department of Homeland Security has the ability to provide funding through its Urban Area Strategic Initiatives (UASI) to assist in the development of these collaborative efforts.

a. Restructure the Urban Area Strategic Initiative (UASI)

As mentioned in Chapter I, DHS recently released the National Preparedness Goals (NPG). Of the seven goals, three directly relate to building counter-terrorism capabilities among jurisdictions, alluding to the need for local governments to

serve an entire region instead of limiting resources to individual communities. Contrary to the regional philosophy outlined in the NPG, DHS has not formatted the Urban Area Strategic Initiative (UASI) in support of its own objectives.

Synchronizing the UASI with the NPG is tantamount to creating an expansion of counter-terrorism capabilities. Revising the process should focus on the distribution of funds for the contiguous cities associated with the specified urban area. These cities are defined as being adjacent to, or within 10 miles from, the border of an identified urban area.¹⁴⁴ UASI money is based upon risk assessment that considers large populations in conjunction with viable terrorist targets. Money is provided to those urban areas and its contiguous cities to increase counter-terrorism capabilities. In most cases, large municipal and county governments benefit from this type of funding as they are the most likely agencies to meet the criteria. These larger entities act as grant administrators, making decisions on the format of the disbursement schedule. There is no requirement for them to allocate funds equally. The funding format is created by the administrator. Since these large city organizations do not traditionally rely upon mutual aid, there is no incentive for them to cooperate with smaller jurisdictions for the purposes of counter-terrorism improvement in the region.

The Los Angeles urban area provides insights as to how the NPG is not being served by the UASI. For 2006, this urban area offering is approximately \$110,000,000. These monies are offered to the Cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach, Los Angeles County, and twenty-one contiguous municipalities as defined by the initiative set forth by DHS.¹⁴⁵ The Los Angeles UASI governance structure is as follows:

- Urban Area Grant Administrator (UAGA): The City of Los Angeles acts as the grant administrator, setting up the governance structure, assigning the voting privileges, and determining the representation of the UAAA and UAWG.

¹⁴⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *Fiscal Year 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative Eligible Applicants*, available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY06_UASI_Eligibility_List.pfd, accessed on March 1, 2006.

¹⁴⁵ The twenty-one contiguous cities for the Los Angeles UASI include: Alhambra, Baldwin Park, Beverly Hills, Burbank, Culver City, El Segundo, Gardena, Glendale, Hawthorne, Hermosa Beach, Inglewood, Manhattan Beach, Monterey Park, Pasadena, Redondo Beach, San Fernando, Santa Monica, South Pasadena, Torrance, Vernon, and Whittier.

- Urban Area Approval Authority (UAAA): This committee has the final vote on initiatives and expenditures. There are eleven voting members.
- Urban Area Working Group (UAWG): This committee prioritizes initiatives, making final recommendations of expenditures to the Urban Area Approval Authority. There are eighteen voting members.
- Sub-Group Representatives: Employees associated with one of the urban area cities or county may belong to one of the sub-groups. Sub-group members have no voting rights and are only able to make suggestions and provide official requests to the UAWG.

The power of the Los Angeles UASI governance structure is embedded in the working group (UAWG), as this committee decides which initiatives will be reviewed by the approval authority (UAAA). While sub-group members represent each of the agencies, this group only makes recommendations and is not allowed to vote on matters of disbursement. Historically, the approval authority has endorsed the recommendations of the working group without modifications, making the UAWG the most powerful committee associated with the Los Angeles urban area.

The votes allotted for each committee appear in Table 22. A clear discrepancy exists in the votes allotted to the City of Los Angeles and the City of Long Beach when compared to the County of Los Angeles and the twenty-one contiguous cities. It would seem the city and county of Los Angeles would receive equal votes while the City of Long Beach and contiguous cities would receive proportional votes based upon viable targets and population. Clearly, the Los Angeles UASI voting power is not distributed equally. This has resulted in a controversial vote, when the working group reduced the priority level of all the 2006 initiatives recommended by the sub-groups representing the twenty-one contiguous cities. With a reduced priority level the contiguous cities will not receive funding for the 2006 Los Angeles UASI. Such aggressive politics in search of achieving individual city programs will not produce the increase in overall urban area capabilities sought by DHS.

Table 23. Los Angeles UASI Work Group (2006)

| UAAA votes ¹⁴⁶ | UAWG votes ¹⁴⁷ | Population ¹⁴⁸ |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Los Angeles (4) | Los Angeles (8) | 3,466,311 |
| Long Beach (4) | Long Beach (4) | 491,564 |
| Los Angeles County (4) | Los Angeles County (4) | 2,798,605 |
| 21Contiguous Cities (1) | 21Contiguous Cities (2) | 1,558,971 |

In order to achieve the NPG of regional collaboration, interoperability and an increase in regional counter terrorism capabilities, the UASI should be altered as follows:

- Create a consistent and equal structure of governance applicable to each designated urban area. Allocate votes for represented agencies as a percentage of total population.¹⁴⁹
- Designate 10% of the total UASI offering to be utilized by contiguous cities in each designated urban area for regional counter terrorism initiatives involving multiple jurisdictions. Allocation of funding shall be determined by a majority vote of the contiguous cities.
- Designate 10% of the total UASI offering to be utilized by contiguous cities in each designated urban area for sustainment funding for regional counter terrorism for already existing initiatives involving multiple jurisdictions. Allocation of funding shall be determined by a majority vote of the contiguous cities.
- Designate 5% of the total UASI offering to be utilized for infrastructure protection for the most critical locations as identified by the UAWG and approved by the UAAA.

¹⁴⁶ Raymond Edey, Commander, Glendale Police Department, e-mail re UASI process, February 16, 2006.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ California Department of Finance, Demographic Estimates, Los Angeles County (2005) <http://www.dof.ca.gov/>

¹⁴⁹ The Los Angeles UASI population total is 8,315,451. The City of Los Angeles represents 41%; the City of Long Beach represents 6%; the County of Los Angeles represents 34%; and, the contiguous cities represent 19% of the overall population. Votes would be distributed in these same percentages for both the UAAA and UAWG.

These altered UASI guidelines balance the power of the urban area governance, ensuring the development and maintenance of regional counter terrorism capabilities, while supporting the NPG of DHS.

3. Consolidate Police Departments

Consolidation closes the gaps identified in the current American police model through the unification of organizations. The consolidation of local police departments normalizes interaction among the merging agencies and provides for unity of command, effort, and purpose.

- Unity of Command: Consolidation allows for the application of a consistent philosophy and methodology, as one person is providing leadership instead of many.
- Unity of Effort: Consolidation reduces or eliminates duplication of responsibilities and assignments, creating a more succinct and effective effort.
- Unity of Purpose: Consolidation forms a single police department, focusing and working in unison to obtain common goals.

The *9/11 Commission Report* indicates the need for the national security institutions of the United States government to achieve unity of effort by reconfiguring in a “smart” manner.¹⁵⁰ The commission describes a framework of agencies duplicating efforts, working independently, and not having someone in charge with the ability to cross agency boundaries while providing overall direction.¹⁵¹ The commission asserts the current structure of government does not provide the best protection for citizens and the need for “quick, imaginative, and agile” change.¹⁵²

The men and women of the World War II generation rose to the challenges of the 1940s and 1950s. They reconstructed the government so that it could protect the country. That is now the job of the generation that experienced 9/11. Those attacks showed, emphatically, that ways of doing business rooted in a different era are just not good enough. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for the world that no longer exists.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ *9/11 Commission Report*, 401.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 401-403.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 399.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

Among its many recommendations to reshape the federal government, the commission commonly identified the need to merge organizations, integrate departments, consolidate responsibilities, and create standardization for the purposes of fighting terrorism.¹⁵⁴ Local police departments require the same type of reorganization for the same purpose.

a. Implement a National Police Force

Creating a national police agency does not require the federalization of all state and local police departments. It does, however, require federal legislation mandating an alteration to the current police structure. Police are a national resource to fight crime and terrorism. They should be reformatted by the federal government to meet the needs of this era. The intent of this legislation should be to provide a standard approach to the most critical elements associated with policing, while allowing state and city officials leadership and management of the day-to-day operations, providing for the best possible law enforcement services for individualized communities. Such legislation would be developed with assistance from law enforcement leaders, line personnel, and citizens throughout the nation. Organizations with the research and development abilities similar to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police would be necessary to provide direct and oversight to the preparation of any legislation concerning the development of a national police force. These stakeholders would assist in creating a national debate on the subject, allowing greater buy-in from every state and local entity. Some of the crucial issues legislation should consider are:

- Standardization of technologies, including but not limited to computer and radio infrastructures, allowing for ease in interoperability and agency-to-agency interfaces.
- Development of like salaries, benefits, and rank structure to allow lateral movement of personnel, providing the ability to increase resources to a specified area when necessary.
- Allowance for sworn officers employed by the national police to enforce the laws of every state and municipality. Such a provision would nationalize mutual aid, much like the fire service.

¹⁵⁴ 9/11 Commission Report, 403-419.

- Provide for a new structure of policing that supports the new national element but gives local control to states and municipalities.

Stephen Flynn, author of *America the Vulnerable*, proposes a national homeland security structure modeled after the Federal Reserve System.¹⁵⁵ Flynn's idea is to create a federal agency that coordinates all aspects of homeland security prevention, protection, and response. He utilizes the Federal Reserve as an example because it has demonstrated the ability to work with public and private partners, and has retained a certain amount of independence from the executive and legislative branches. With slight modifications, his idea has the potential to be applied to the building of a new national police model. An example of this is as follows:

- National Governance Committee: Members of this board would be responsible for establishing and maintaining national police policy and standards, along with defining the role of the national police force in fighting the war on terrorism. They would report to congress, create the annual police budget, and ultimately be responsible for providing the necessary resources for the police. This board would be policy-making in nature and not involve itself with operational matters. The members of this committee would be appointed by the President, House of Representatives, and Senate, in equal numbers, and serve ten-year terms.
- State Board of Trustees: Each of the fifty states would establish a board of trustees that would be responsible for researching and recommending police training and operations consistent with the needs of each state, in alignment with the National Governance Committee established policies. The Governor of each state would appoint trustees with two-thirds approval from the state legislative body. Trustees would serve seven-year terms.
- Metropolitan Executive Board: This board would consist of city managers or mayors, from each city represented within the defined metropolitan area. These executives would be responsible for overseeing the areas' police force. They would ensure the non-duplication of services, maintain accountability to the public, and provide local leadership and direction.

Funding for a national police department would be divided among all levels of government. This would possibly eliminate the need for the current UASI, as federal money would already be provided, in conjunction with state and local funding for police. With a national police agency, it is theorized that counter-terrorism capabilities would be increased as each element of the police force would receive the same training, equipment, and have access to the same resources.

¹⁵⁵ Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable* (New York: Harper, 2004), 144-155.

D. RECOMMENDATION

A combination of the first and second policy option is recommended. These two policies are achievable, while the third option possesses far too many challenges to effectively complete in a reasonable timeframe. Creating police standardization in the area of radio infrastructure and computer systems is a difficult task, but not impossible. This may be accomplished by federal mandate or through the legislative process. This is not a drastic approach to interoperability considering the slow progress in this area since 2001. A federal mandate is far overdue. While the UASI was reconfigured just one year ago, this thesis provides evidence that it is flawed and open to manipulation in its current state. The UASI must be aligned with the NPG; otherwise these goals will never be obtained.

The standardization described in the first policy option will allow police departments to work more closely together, building trust and teamwork. The second policy option will create the incentive for partnerships and the construction of valuable counter terrorism initiatives similar to the FAST model discussed in Chapter VI. The combination of these two options will contribute to a more centralized police scheme and increase capabilities to an acceptable level. From these policy changes, the chances for police service mergers and total consolidation increases.

E. FURTHER RESEARCH

The idea of consolidating local police departments to enable greater security from terrorism requires a public debate. Globalization has changed the way communities interact, and it appears the current model of policing does not provide for the best counter-terrorism apparatus to protect citizens. Greater research is warranted in the area of local control of police departments. A focus on the desire of citizens is necessary to determine if communities are willing to accept a reduced amount of control in exchange for a more robust police department most able to provide greater protection from terrorism.

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